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 This paper intends to create a framework of analysis for Globalization-Related 
changes and phenomena in the international world. Starting with the premise that institutions 
included in the international arena are based on old state-centric theories that are no longer 
enough to explain the world phenomena the article flows through older theorists such as 
Kenichi Ohmae and James Rosenau to draw comparisons with newer scholarships, like the 
ideas from Bertrand Badie. By choosing four of the most important paradigms of international 
relations (Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War & Global Issues and Borders), the article criticizes 
and explains how globalization changes the way those paradigms work and interact with 
institutions and the global system, besides proposing new methods of analysis to create 
adapted assessments and real comprehension over today’s international phenomena.  
The article concludes that Rosenau’s idea on the importance of Micro-Macro relations 
both relates to Kenichi’s point of view on the importance of individuals and non-state actors, 
which complies with the arguments presented by Badie, two decades later, in his assessment 
over Diplomacy. The summarized conclusion is that individuals have been empowered to take 
part in international relations; in a way institutions have to adapt and comply to be able to 
succeed. Nevertheless, State-related institutions and actors are still very important to the 
international arena, as they hold roles, agenda setting power and resources to address issues 
and political discussions.  
In this sense, to prove the validity of the conclusions, the article draws an analysis on 
the Brazilian conjuncture, showing that all the four paradigms are obsolete if not analyzed by 
means of globalized analytical tools, and that smarter action from institutions is needed to 
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From the 1940’s to today, the world unpredictably became unpredictable, hard to 
understand. Why? Did education lose quality? Are the changes too fast for theorists and 
analysts to follow? In my stance of the world, what is misunderstood is the very core, the first 
assumption in which most mainstream and critical theory are based upon: The unit of 
analysis, the atom being the state within a state-centric world view. Such state-centrism will 
be the main focus of analysis of this work. 
 There has been a major change both in the world and in society in the last decades, 
which most people feel through technological developments, or through the appraisal of 
different international phenomena denoting integration. This was not, though, a subtle or 
unpredicted phenomenon. Often named globalization, it exists for a relatively long time now, 
especially as one considers pioneer works on the subject, as Rosenau’s, which are over 2 
decades old by now. Globalization has certainly changed the way people relate to other 
people internationally, and the news is that, although it hasn’t been mainly taken into account, 
it deeply affects the way the whole International System behaves and is explained, to the 
extent of questioning the real existence of an anarchical setting of sovereign states. (Kenichi, 
1996). In this sense, if one considers the predominance of the notion of the state as being at 
the center stage of the study and analysis of International Relations Theory, such theory is 
destined to always be a step behind the world’s history, when considering the consequences 
of globalization. Thus, recognizing the need to change this scenario, by focusing on 
institutions and other international tools created by the State Centric Paradigm, i.e. Diplomacy 
(Badie, 2008), this essay shall analyze the new trends for theoretical development in 
international relations regarding the structural change globalization leads day to day, 
impacting paradigms of international relations, such as Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, for 
instance. 
The development of new communication methods, the creation of new technology, the 
advent of information science and the new means of transportation have done far more than 




state. They have changed the way individuals interact with the world and, in a deeper 
analysis, have empowered individuals to act globally (Badie, 2008). What is the connection, 
then, with the unpredictability of world phenomena like the Arab Spring; and what is the 
restriction posed to theory, regarding this point of view?  
In order to explain it, I may draw an analogy with an area of social studies that has 
been through a similar situation. The International Court of Justice Judge, Professor Antonio 
Augusto Cançado Trindade (2008), in his lecture about the development of International Law, 
talks about three major moments in International Law history. At first, he describes the 
creation of international law. At its very beginning, professor Cançado says, International 
Law was meant as a tool for individuals to reach justice in the international level1. In his 
stance his explanation, the judge cites some of the considered founding fathers of 
International Law, like Grotius, Puffendorf, Francesco Soares and Francesco de Vitoria, and 
shows how their ideas of what international law was did put the individuals in the midst of 
analysis, as the main subject matter. As the years came by, though, Trindade describes how 
the rise of the State centric theory in the XIX century led International Law to become not a 
law for individuals, but a law for states. International Law started to take individuals away 
from the center of law and disputes, and instead, started to have its discussions focused on 
treaties and alliances, reinforcing the central role of the state. Considering the state the unit of 
International Relations is a feature the contemporary generation of international scholars is 
used to, but it is not how international relations began (Badie, 2008) (Barber, 2013) (Cançado 
Trindade, 2008). Also, Trindade affirms that there is a turning trend in International Law. 
Deriving from minority protection movements and ethnical groups protection theory, 
International Law gradually started putting individuals in the center of their own discussions, 
which professor Trindade calls a return to its origin, and not any kind of institutional 
innovation, as most scholars state (Trindade, 2008). I believe International Relations are 
undergoing a similar movement. 
Today’s diplomacy, for example, derives basically from the trends of diplomacy from 
about 400 years ago, according to professor Badie. In that time, Diplomacy was a means of 
solving problems for Princes, that is, individuals. They were the subjects of diplomacy, and 
would control it through their own individual strategy. Whether it was a border discussion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  understand	  ‘International’	  is	  not	  a	  proper	  word	  to	  describe	  the	  moment.	  Europe,	  
where	  this	  development	  started,	  was	  not	  yet	  a	  continent	  with	  the	  nations	  we	  know	  
today.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  deepening	  in	  this	  fact,	  though,	  and	  aware	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  




around the building of a bridge, or a negotiation on farmable lands regarding inheritance, 
Princes were the final subjects, and diplomacy was built onto that basis (Badie, 2008). 
At this point, it is important to ponder some matters. Throughout the article, I may 
criticize part of the state-centric theory, as I believe it is not enough of a representative theory 
to explain how the world works. Hence it is not fine to use it as the basis for the institutions 
built in a country. However, this essay will not defend the end of Nation States (Barber, 
2013), and, thus, will not propose the end of diplomacy as a means of communications 
between governments or anything alike. This is exactly the point I wanted to reach. It’s fine to 
create formal channels of communication between governments. The problem is that the basic 
premise of creating diplomacy is accepting the theoretical unit of international relations as the 
state and using this worldview to recognize diplomacy as the means of communication 
between countries, nations. This will be discussed with further details on the following pages, 
but something important to state right now is that countries are much more than the 
governments they embed (Badie, 2008).  
Countries are made of enterprises, NGO’s, institutions, cities, provinces and, above 
all, people. All of these units, in the globalized world we live in (and this is a reality!), are 
capable of relating to counterparts or other instances internationally, creating what I like 
calling paradiplomacy2. If we try to think of all of the possibilities that arise in this context, it 
is impossible to accept diplomacy as the formal means of communication between countries, 
as even governments become small portions of what international relations are. Following the 
trend, foreign policy can lose some sense if we think of it. In the globalized world, how much 
of trade system and financial operations are undertaken by governments? How much of the 
culture spread out is done under the sovereignty of a government? Everything looks different, 
unpredictable. Immigration, NGO’s, police forces, movies, books, information and 
international phenomena flow throughout the countries in a rate no government is capable of 
controlling.  
Therefore, we need a new way of understanding the world, where states are not the 
units, but part of the political equation that shapes foreign policy, for example. In this new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Although	  paradiplomacy	  is	  a	  term	  originally	  created	  by	  Soldatos	  (1990)	  to	  describe	  the	  
relation	  between	  cities	  and	  subunits	  of	  the	  state	  in	  an	  international	  level,	  I	  believe	  it’s	  
important	  to	  expand	  the	  concept	  here,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  avoiding	  the	  creation	  of	  other	  words	  
and	  concepts.	  Professor	  Ironildes	  (2013)	  may	  state	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  
paradiplomacy	  and	  corporate	  diplomacy;	  nonetheless,	  this	  articles	  scope	  is	  too	  simple	  




way of viewing the world, global issues like climate change acquire a very different meaning. 
But let us start with the beginning. 
I may explain how this article will be organized. The next two chapters will be 
focused on the formal design of the article. At first, a review on the important literature used 
to make the essay, going through concepts, authors, and what their ideas are. The intent of the 
section is to make it clear where the article is. I want to leave no doubt on the theories I will 
criticize, and the concepts I will adopt, so that there is no misunderstanding, or at least there’s 
less. Also, this section will encompass all of the theory I want to use to explain my thoughts. 
It will serve as a nest to everything I say. All of the ideas, arguments, examples, conclusions 
and analysis will be based on one of the theories formally stated in this section. The limits of 
using them, as well as the consequences, will be explained there. 
After that, I will spend some time trying to formulate what methodologically has to be 
said. What is the research design of the essay? How will ideas be tested, assessed and proved 
true or wrong? How will the hypothesis be analyzed? What are the variables to be 
understood? How do they relate to one another? What is the relevance of assessing them? 
What will be the criteria used to explain the variables? All of these questions will be answered 
in this section. It is supposed to create the skeleton of the article, in a way that any 
International Relations scholar can think of the same variables and draw the same or different 
conclusions. 
The last development section is to be a practical assessment of what would happen 
should we use the described tools and theories to explain a case. In case we put the 
individuals in the arena and change our worldview mode to an inclusive model, as proposed 
by Badie, a model that embraces globalization instead of not understanding it and neglecting 
its consequences. The main focus will be on the new opportunities and channels arisen by the 
new worldview, the new communication and relationship opportunities that the new 
International Relations scholars will have to deal with. 
The conclusion of the article will serve as an epitome. In that part, the final tests will 
be made to the hypothesis and one may finally assess whether the ideas presented during the 
whole piece are or not congruent, are or not real. This article is not intended to prove a point, 
but to assess if the efforts made on the intent of explaining the international arena are being 
well focused and distributed. I will make some considerations on the most important 
challenges the world faces, and the likely outcome is to understand the new model of viewing 
the world as an opportunity to tackle global issues in a different way, besides boosting 




Having described the sections of the article, and created a simple forecast on what one 
should expect from reading this piece of work, I may present my first analytical tool, a 
research question. This research question will provide guidance to the whole essay and is 
certainly one of the most important parts of the work, as the rest of the pages are mainly an 
attempt to answer it in a proper way. My research question is a causal question, and shall be 
stated this way: Why have the world contemporary phenomena become so hard to understand 
and predict? 
Although it looks like a simple question, it encompasses two very important features. 
The first is that it assumes an increase in the difficulty of analyzing the world and the 
international relations phenomena. Albeit this assumption will be better explained in the next 
chapters, it is important to lay it bare, as it represents the first theoretical effort done by me in 
order to figure out what the world is. It is a historical effort, based on both Badie and 
Rosenau, which were the first inspirations for this article.  
The second one is that besides acknowledging that global phenomena became harder 
to understand, I clearly state that there is a reason for it. This shall create two paths, which I 
may follow: A rational and a methodological. The former is approached during the essay, by 
explaining my view on the world and my interpretation of other authors’ ideas; I will always 
be looking for this one reason (or stack of reasons), which made global phenomena more 
intricate. The latter, by asking a why- question, I put a challenge to create a scientific piece 
through a causal research design, which may go through some case studies and pure logical 
deepening into theory and ideas. 
Should the reader disagree with any of the features of the research question, any 
analysis or conclusion drawn from the research effort will seem vague and empty. In order to 
create a reasonable research work, though, and to enable a rational flow of ideas, one shall 
absorb these features and the premises behind so as to use them as the basis for the 
conclusions drawn. In this sense, considering no gross methodological errors will be made, I 
may manage to draw a path for my arguments and the reader may, then, agree or not with the 
achieved results.  
Aside from the space for thinking that the research question provides, the first thing it 
generates is the need for a response. In this sense, I shall provide, at this first moment, a 
hypothesis, which I presume will be an accurate answer for the research question. The 
following chapters and efforts will serve as a tool to analyze this hypothesis, using various 
theoretical approaches so it can be stressed and, if my thoughts are right, proved. There is no 




methodology applied on the writing process are the actual treasures behind the scientific 
research.  
Said that, I may present my hypothesis. Considering the abovementioned problem, the 
theoretical limits for understanding the globalized world, and the proposed research question, 
on the reasons why the world became harder to explain and understand, I propose the 
following answer:  The world did not become harder to understand. The contemporary 
situation of the world followed a logical and streamlined historical path. The old theoretical 
basis, though, and specially the political and non-political institutions derived from it, is, 
thus, the outdated paradigm.  Those old-fashioned institutions do prevent, e.g. economical 
development, as they restrict (or don’t understand) the possible interactions between non-
recognized international actors in the international arena; they also prevent efficient tackling 
on global issues as they restrict international activity to a narrow set of actors defined by an 
outdated theoretical model. Taking that into account, those state centric based institutions 
preclude the fulfillment of the world’s potential of interaction and growth as they restrict 
worldviews to variables, actors and categories that are not anymore the pivots or the leading 
actors in the international setting.  
There are several comments that need be made about using a hypothesis like mine. At 
first, it’s a very hard to falsify one. I mean, if you take account of the revealed problem, the 
hypothesis is nothing but a summary of what the world already is, although it’s an answer to 
the research question. The problem seems obvious, the core of it as well, so, why did I keep 
what looks like a biased hypothesis on my research work? Why did I keep a hypothesis that 
does not seem in need for much more explanation or research? There are three reasons for 
that.  
The first reason is summarized by the word paradigm, within the hypothesis. I make, 
at first, the assumption that it takes many students some time to understand, that political and 
international relations theory play a major role on the formation of structures and institutions. 
Although every young scholar knows no theory is capable of explaining the entire world in a 
holistic way (and that is not a flaw, but a limit from theoretical thought, necessary to build 
working models), it takes a longer time until they start figuring out what the influence of 
theory is in the world we live in. Political institutions, institutional innovations, governmental 
programs, business strategy, all these humankind formal institutions are created after long 
periods of planning.  This planning session often (if not always) includes analyzing theory 
and choosing fitting authors, models and ideas, so that outcomes and challenges can be 




moment they were created, and that’s not different from international institutions and agents. 
Diplomacy, geopolitical studies, war strategy, business expansion plans, the international 
agenda and so many more institutions have a clear theoretical basis, and that’s fine. The 
problem is that once the theory is no longer capable of explaining the world in a proper way, 
once it becomes outdated, the institutions that were created with basis on it will probably lose 
efficiency or face new problems and challenges. That’s development, that’s when institutional 
innovation takes place. When it comes to international relations, though, as the assumed 
outdated paradigm (the state centric view, which takes States for the atoms, the units of 
International Relations) didn’t change from older theories to contemporary theory, even 
institutional innovation won’t solve the new problems and challenges that may arise.  
The second reason is that even if it looks obvious, especially when you present 
evidence (and evidence will be shown), there is no foreseeable development towards the 
hypothesis.  Although world interaction trends are to become even more globalized in sectors 
like trade, scientific development, social media and etc., tackling of global issues solutions 
like climate change still seek for options within the old fashioned institutions created by the 
state centric model. The recent conferences on Environment in Rio attest that, and the recently 
scheduled Conference in Europe for 2015 shows even more evidence. I can do nothing but 
assume we are trying to achieve different results by trying the same thing, and this makes no 
sense. It is not as though renowned theorists ignore everything about this, or as if decision 
takers are oblivious to globalization in order to keep on working on their own jobs. What 
might explain that, though, are the thoughts of two scholars, Graham T. Allison and Maria 
Helena Castro Santos. Despite the fact that they differ in many of their theoretical 
assumptions and creations, there is a drawn conclusion from them, which encompasses an 
explanation for the mentioned problem. They both believe there is no rationale in politics. I 
mean, they both draw models that assume politics aren’t but the resultant answer from a 
tremendously complex and crazy game of interests and influence. In this sense, it should not 
be a surprise that there is very little chance the world will change to a different organizational 
model. Again, I attest, I do not think it even makes sense to cry out for the extermination of 
Nation States, as they are established institutions. My idea is thinking of a world in which 
they are not the atoms, but part of the equation. It is important that global issues are tackled, 
and if the very single model in which we try to organize to address them is meaningless, 
something has to be done.  
At last, but not least, there is a third reason to justify choosing to keep this hypothesis 




Provided that the hypothesis is proven, just in case, what happens is that we have an 
accredited model to say most institutions within the international level are predestined to fail. 
I am not only talking about political institutions, but multinational corporations’ expansion 
strategies, education system recruitment agencies’ lectures, everything, may be based upon 
the wrong pillars. We may have been fooled by our own thoughts of what the international 
arena has been for the last decades, in a way that we may have misunderstood most of the 
important international phenomena and, worst, we may be unaware of what the real potential 
of international interaction that globalization can create is. In that case, I want, more than 
proving my hypothesis, to draw some of the changes, in a minor level, that could exist, 
considering the hypothesis to be true. This is a very big challenge, and I do not expect this 
under graduation essay to do it. Nonetheless, I believe it is accomplishable to draw some 
ideas on specific sectors or industries. If so, what I can possibly be doing is drawing part of 
what future consulting, politics, economy and global interdependence may be, in a very 
simple and gross way. That would be enough. 
These three are the reasons why I chose to keep a hard to falsify hypothesis, not 
because it would make my work easier, but because it would make it harder, as besides 
proving my hypothesis, I need to create an environment on which it can operate, an 
environment that differs and diverges from what international relations theory has been trying 
to be in the past 50 years. It’s quite a big challenge, and, I think, worth the risk. 
Although aforementioned in a few ways, I believe it’s important to clearly state what 
the objectives of the research work are. As said beforehand, my hypothesis admits a simple 
delay problem within International Relations Theory, but a problem that may cause all of the 
efforts done within theory to be unaware of important features of the globalized world. In this 
sense, there are two main general objectives I want to achieve throughout the research 
process. The first one is to create a review on Badie’s thoughts on the subject. This review, 
however, will be an analytic one. In simpler words, I want to merge Badie’s ideas with 
various other authors’ in order to describe the necessary rational basis for the position Badie 
and other authors defend, which is also mine.  
Despite the fact that it seems like a simple objective, it embeds a very important 
premise. Throughout International Relations and, in a bigger picture, Political and Social 
Sciences history, there has been a separate development between the so-called American 
School and the European (specially the French) School. In a very simple assessment, the 
Europeans, mainly the French, got closer to sociology while studying International Relations, 




Relations was destined to have a state-centric analysis, for example, while some French 
theories do recognize more of the work of sociologists like Durkheim, for example, within 
their analysis of International Relations, which creates space for different theories on how the 
international arena works. None of them is better or worse, but the ways the worldviews are 
built are very different. Also, due to the fact that most of the available theory comes from the 
US, it is true to say there is a balance problem within people’s world-views about the world, 
and that reflects, as said before, on the institutions, models, strategies and businesses that we 
create. Within that structure, my objective when gathering Badie’s and other authors’ ideas is 
also an effort to create some alternative means of understanding the world both to new 
scholars and to ordinary readers. 
The second general objective is to provide insights on the existence of other ways of 
interacting with the world. The idea is that showcasing a new world-view has the potential to 
unlock new possibilities and opportunities for people, organizations and even governments to 
relate among themselves. Considering the hypothesis I drew, there is still plenty of space for 
these new interactions to be created and this is the kind of potential I want to unleash. Global 
Entrepreneurship, this is what the new status of the globalized world can grant. Born-global 
enterprises shall be no long rare, international development and cooperation efforts have to be 
the rule, not the exception. The solution for most problems people have is very likely 
somewhere around the world. The second objective, thus, is to be part of the creation of the 
basis for these solutions and opportunities to become globalized, as the world did. 
Stating such objectives is an important exercise, since they will both serve as guidance 
for the research and indicators of its success on the assessment of the final results.  
More than stating such audacious goals, though, it is important to create the path for 
some specific achievement, which will serve both to prove the hypothesis (and, on this 
specific dissertation’s case, assessing its implementation) and to specify the details involved. 
Hence, there are four chosen specific objectives I want to achieve during the research process, 
which will serve both to strengthen the results and to create a practical environment for the 
hypothesis to work with. 
The first objective is to show who the new actors of the international scene are. I have 
described the importance of knowing there are more important subjects of the international 
arena beforehand, but this single action of clearly stating who they may be is the one going to 
trigger the potential unleashing objective. As my hypothesis states, some actors of the 
international system are still unaware of their possible role in the world. In this sense, taking 




The second one is to criticize the idea of the nation state as the unit of the international 
system. At some points, this does seem to be the nucleus of the role of the theoretical model I 
am trying to draw. Although it is partially true, if you take my general objectives into 
consideration, this critic can’t but be part of the whole construction of a bigger argument, 
which focuses much more on potential and opportunities, and much less on problems. With 
that stated, criticizing the state centric status of international theory is one of my specific 
goals. 
The third is to draw relations between technology development (communications, 
transports, IT) and international phenomena. The idea behind this objective is that if I want to 
create a world view capable of understanding the globalized world, I need to create the basis 
in which the new tools and development created by globalization are accepted within an 
international scope. This means considering communications, transports, IT and other 21st 
century technologies and realities as important aspects of the international phenomena and of 
the relations between international actors, in a way that the creation of practical solutions and 
models become feasible. That means if I can draw these relations I may be able to understand 
in which ways the globalized tools of development can affect international relations. 
The fourth and last specific objective of the research is to introduce changes in 
worldviews, which can cause all areas of thought and human interrelations to alter. It looks 
bigger than it really is. As this topic is to be developed within the whole research, the specific 
objective is to create understanding on why the international system structure, its institutions 
and even the interrelations people draw themselves (within businesses, NGO’s, academy, 
politics…) should be different, in case we change our worldview, which is what defines them. 
In this sense, I am proposing an effort in a sense divergent from theoretical thinking. The 
objective is to find real evidence of this need of adaptation in order to create new models of 
behavior and of institutionalization. The potential achievement is to change strategy and 
possibilities from the way business go international to the way cities interact with each other.   
Having presented the logical process I will follow during my research, my objectives 
and my guidance tools, I shall spend some time describing some of the problems I wish to 
tackle. I will keep the central problem of the research project off for now, in order to bring 
small challenges that the work will face to the discussion. Also, I don’t expect to describe 
every problem caused by a limited understanding of the world in this section. As I stated 
before, every institution and human relation can change, if a worldview is changed. In this 




The first problem is the limited view of theory upon society regarding international 
matters, along with the limited view of society itself upon the world. Whether the world won’t 
recognize the role of society in the international arena or society won’t pose itself in order to 
become a major actor within international relations, in any case we have a problem. This is to 
be tackled by showing evidence of the ascendant importance of society in the international 
arena, and also by stating it as an actor on the international system. 
The second problem is the lack of efficiency on tackling global issues. The main idea 
here is that an issue like climate change, for example, cannot be solved on the 
intergovernmental level. What I am trying to convey is that global issues concerning the 
whole of society and the whole of the institutions, governments, NGO’s and enterprises in the 
world are not going to be solved by each of them alone. Governments are not efficient in 
tackling issues like climate change or global trade, as they are not supposed to do so. This 
problem is to be solved by understanding that solutions for emerging global issues are to be 
solved by actors directly involved with them, and those actors need to be empowered to do so. 
We will take more time on this later. 
The third problem is the lack of opportunities for collaboration. This problem is 
generated when decision-takers within national governments, for example, are not aware of 
the opportunities of collaboration the world does offer to them. It can be true in any of the 
organizational levels of a governmental institution (cities, provinces, countries), and can be 
true if local actors are not empowered, either, i.e., a multinational company which runs out of 
investments because no new markets have been mapped for expansion. This issue is harder to 
solve, even though the solution is quite simple. One of the objectives of this essay is to make 
people aware of the new opportunities globalization has generated on collaboration and 
cooperation, and this is a comprehensive solution for the mentioned problem. The challenge is 
to fulfill it, as there is a need for a global engagement program (in the individual level) 
capable of disseminating the idea. 
Another problem is the classical zero-sum assumption posed to most international 
relations phenomena. Although even some mainstream theories have acknowledged zero-sum 
is no longer the reality of international relations (as negotiations and deals are supposed to 
benefit both parts of the treaty of agreement, even in the nation state level), some important 
institutions (i.e. diplomacy and foreign policy decisions) are still driven by this kind of logic. 
The consequence of it is that cooperation and interdependence are potentially lower due to the 
zero-sum rationalization. A solution for it is the showcase of evidence this article is willing to 




development. Once the development potentiality is proven, the odds actors will adhere it are 
high. 
The last problem is the incomplete assessments of world strategy for businesses and 
branding plans. By this I mean private institutions are also affected by a limited nation state 
centric worldview. In this case, more important than the solution (which would be awareness), 
are the new possibilities arisen from this new worldview. In this sense, Science of Complexity 
related solutions are to be analyzed as a new way of understanding corporate and private 
global relations. 
By explaining my ideas I shall state I am aware of the challenges it will face in a real 
environment. Although even attesting how hard falsifying the hypothesis I built may seem 
controversial with this statement, it is important to think of the contemporary structures of 
international relations as a reality, as globalization is a reality that must be faced by theory. In 
this sense, one has to understand traditional institutional models are not likely to disappear in 
the short, middle and even long term. States will probably remain states, as diplomacy will 
probably remain the same. Institutional innovation is likely to happen, of course. Nonetheless, 
as previously stated, even institutional innovation, if based on the same outdated paradigm of 
state centric international relations, is not enough of a change to impact the functioning of 
institutions.  
Old models are likely to continue existing, as decision makers are likely to continue 
basing their decisions on old theoretical models, although they do adapt to changes in society 
somehow, especially considering major changes in public opinion and individuals 
empowerment. This is not, though, a pessimist forecast. The model I want to defend does 
consider the mutual existence of every actor in the international arena, which is in some sense 
close to the reality of the contemporary world. Having the old actors recognize the new 
participants, though, is going to be challenging. Also, having scholars and the academy 
understand that the very core of the institutionalization of the international system is destined 
to be inefficient and to reach no solution is going to be hard. This difficulty, however, is part 
of the adapting procedures the world has to go through. Within societal relations, it’s surely 
faster. In the individual level, every new generation has new features and characteristics. My 
thoughts lead me to think this is the path we created for the international arena. The slow-
paced change will lead to a societal like analysis on the international phenomena, a 
sociological approach capable of catching more than the interests of Prime Ministers and 
saying they are the interests of States, but of analyzing individual data and creating patterns 




One last thing that is important to bring up within the introduction section is the 
importance I believe this article may have for the scientific community.  If you consider the 
objectives, at first, you will see that this essay represents at least two important aspects.  
The first is a comprehensive assessment on the work of a scholar who differs from the 
mainstream current of theory. Maybe it encompasses solutions for specific issues or ideas that 
could unlock change within institutions, decisions and even other ideas. Considering this, the 
assessment work, besides the analysis, is a broadcasting work, which is also important for 
science. 
A second unfolding is the possible number of new relations this work is capable of 
creating. Interactions between International Relations and individuals, technology, IT, 
Complexity Studies and much more, are still innovative ways of addressing International 
Relations, and they may hold many discoveries within them, many insights and maybe even 
new models, phenomena and theory. In this sense, scientific work is capable of imagining 
new ways of behaving and interacting with the world, both for international actors, 
institutions and individuals. 
If you consider the hypothesis, you will see I assume there is a problem within 
international theory. From my point of view, theory is outdated and, therefore, is not capable 
of explaining the world in a proper way anymore. This opens space for further development 
on International Relations Theory, which opens space for new interpretations of the world 
itself and new institutions within the globalized arena. This is a very important achievement 
this essay is able to reach, although the challenges may harden the work. In this sense, the 
problem, the research question and the hypothesis proposed are related to very important 
discussions and matters within International Relations.  
The conclusion, thus, is that the efforts applied within this dissertation are both 
legitimate and important for social science, as they can help understand the new shape the 
world has taken. As the world is not likely going to stop globalizing, we are the ones in need 
of adaptation. The faster we do it, the faster we will start taking advantage on the benefits of 











What does theory say? 
 
“There can be an awareness of world changes without an 
awareness of that awareness” 
—F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist3 
This quote has a very special meaning within this article. Whether we are talking 
about scholars, the general public, institutions or even the government, it embeds a simple 
truth, which sets the tone of my ideas. The profound changes globalization drew in the world 
are a reality, and although mainstream theory has not found a way to explain them yet, all 
over the world individuals, institutions and other players have been taking advantage of them.  
Now it’s time, though, to embrace an important task. I have been writing on the 
objectives I have for the article, on the theoretical problems I have seen, but, if we dig deeper, 
what are these problems? This is the moment to take a position and state, clearly, where I am, 
theoretically speaking, and where I want to go. 
The hypothesis I drew to explain the problem stated by the research question says the 
outdated paradigm of state centrism, because of its condition, generates institutions that are 
destined to fail, or, at least, to have insurmountable difficulties, and that tend to get harder as 
globalization continues to grow. In this sense, and to keep the essay short, I have chosen four 
of those institutions, which I believe will be a good representation of the universe of 
institutions available in the world, for their importance, their reach within international 
relations and for their flaws. They are: Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War and Borders. 
Although these are not real institutions, like the UN or WTO, for instance, they are analogue 
to them, as they are built with basis on theory and they do act upon the world to shape it.  
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At first, let’s take a look at Diplomacy. From the state centric point of view, 
Diplomacy is the official means of communication for the international arena (Sending, 
Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011). When I say Diplomacy, thus, I am talking about bilateral 
communications, but, as well, about negotiation within International Organizations and 
multilateral seminars and debates. Diplomacy plays the role of the basic tool for creating 
relationship, the basic communication tool between States in the International System 
(Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011).  It is the way the nations ought to relate with each 
other, for every matter, and has several faces.  
In this sense, States make diplomacy, as an outcome of national interests and 
international negotiation, within global politics. The role of Diplomacy in International 
Relations, then, is to be the political tool for States to relate to each other. It is the way 
bargains are made, treaties are signed and quarrels are solved, or not. It’s the bridge through 
which interests flow in the international arena. Hence it is considered to be the way States 
communicate with each other, and holds a very important position in International Relations 
Analyses. This is an old view, though.  
It is important to know that scholarships have been thinking on the changes and turns 
diplomacy suffers, both in the way it happens and, in a bigger picture, in its roles within 
International Relations. From the 1980’s on, authors like Andrew F. Cooper, John English 
and Ramesh C. Thakur (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) have started drawing these 
changes, and have accomplished some very interesting outcomes. Among their predictions, 
there is the growth in the diplomatic importance of NGO’s, Multinational Corporations and 
even celebrities. (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) This opens space for some thinking. It 
is understandable that those actors have some importance within diplomacy. The divergence 
is caused because Sending argues those new characters have the potential to become sole 
actors for the diplomatic arena.(Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) Since the 1980’s, thus, 
developments within international relations analysis have been acknowledging the existence 
of different actors other than the Nation States. Sending goes further. Ask yourself: what 
causes changes in the turning trends of diplomacy? According to him, literature about new 
diplomacy is essentially a description of the effects of globalization.(Sending, Pouliot, & 
Neumann, 2011) In this sense, globalization means a gradual deterritorialization of social and 
political relations, in a way that both the diplomat’s role and nature – to represent by distance 
– change irreparably. (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) 
Similarly, Bertrand Badie’s Le Diplomat et L’Intrus explains how diplomacy has 




he calls La Diplomatie de Boudoir4, in secrecy. The games of diplomacy were not to be 
accessed by individuals, by non-professionals, not keen on the arts of negotiation and 
influenced by emotions. (Badie, 2008) International Relations, and thus, diplomacy, were to 
be held by states only, an interstate subject. According to Badie, we cannot, in today’s days, 
restrict to this kind of narrow definition, regarding diplomacy. Diplomacy is not anymore the 
art of interstate negotiation, as stated by Nicolson in 19635. Diplomacy is the art of 
responding to every problem associated with the effects of separation and of distinction 
between spaces of proclaimed sovereignty6. In this sense, its role becomes to manage, within 
the international arena, the function of representation and communication, for all related 
actors.7 And this effect, according to Badie, derives from globalization, as it demands the 
worldview that built diplomacy to rebuild itself. 
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the understanding of diplomacy goes much 
beyond its old concept. This opens space for understanding, for example, what the actual 
power of technologies is, regarding world communications.  If one considers diplomacy to be 
the whole of communications and representation within the international arena, for actors 
other than the state, technologies, besides playing a very important role on the way diplomacy 
happens, triggers development of the tool to a much more complex level. In this new world, 
e.g. social media, Internet, data analysis and branding acquire a major role in shaping 
international relations. The way institutions and people relate to the world become more fluid, 
and the possibilities of interaction rise exponentially. If seen with the eyes of state centric 
theory, thus, diplomacy becomes an institution with limited applicability to the world we live 
in. 
Having spoken about diplomacy, let’s move on to the next institution, Foreign Policy. 
“Now take therefore what modern technology is capable of. To the 
power of our moral sense, allied to the power of modern communications and 
our ability to organize internationally. That, in my view, gives us the first 
opportunity, as a community, to fundamentally change the world. Foreign 
Policy can never be the same again, it cannot be run by elites, it has to be run, 
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by listening to public opinions, of peoples who are blogging, who are 
communicating with each other, around the world.”8 
When the former Prime Minister of The UK said the sentence above, he was talking to 
hundreds of people in one of the most prestigious stages of the world. In his speech, he 
wanted to urge for the understanding of the new strength for interconnection, interdependence 
and interaction that new technologies in communication had created, and how this changes 
the world we live in to every aspect. He showed how public opinion set off by shared pictures 
on the Internet had opened space for political change and for the creation of institutions, for 
example. 
Although it partly spoils the end of the section on Foreign Policy, Brown’s quotation 
gives important content for analysis. At first, though, if Foreign Policy has to change, what is 
it now? Accepted definitions call Foreign Policy a government’s strategy in dealing with 
other nations.   
A country formulates its own foreign policy, and applies it in international politics; 
global chambers of discussion, where treaties are negotiated and issues go through the 
agenda. Foreign policy is formulated in a different way depending on the country. To simplify 
the understanding on it, I want to use the concepts drawn by two authors, Graham T. Allison 
and Maria Helena de Castro Santos. Although they write about very different subjects (the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and the turmoil on bio fuel in Brazil, respectively), they both describe a 
political process that is useful for us, which is decision making. Allison describes a model 
where diverse actors, directly involved or not in situations, struggle, making use of their 
influence capacity and playing with their interests. This sense, the individual capacity of 
politicians, lobbyists, entrepreneurs, executives and any other involved individual, institution 
or organization, plus their role within the structure, play a game in which the decision, the 
policy, is the resultant force, not any kind of rational decision. Maria Helena describes a 
process close to this. In her opinion, in order to understand decision processes it is necessary 
to know whom the involved actors are, their role, interest and risk in being part of the 
decision process. This way, you can calculate what she calls a quarrel, rounds of discussion 
and negotiation in which, again, policy is nothing but a resultant of a game of influences and 
rhetorical speeches. Their vision is important to understand how foreign policy is created. It is 
not like foreign policy creation is a complete reasonless process, but it is not a completely 
economical man rational process. The limit of Allison and Santos’ theories is the structure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Agents are comprised within structures, and do follow rules and plans set before their 
discussions, in a way that foreign policy creation is to be understood as a partially rational 
process, as it depends on the interests of the involved players, as well.  
Taking that into account, we fall into the same dilemma Badie describes for 
diplomacy. Foreign policy is built within the doors of government; nonetheless, it is supposed 
to deal with national interests who are closely related to the populace and to the different 
national actors in a country, including NGO’s, corporations and scholars. The path, then, is to 
try to observe it from a decentralized view.  Observing the construction of foreign policy and 
its application from a decentralized view, we can account the appearance of aspects other than 
politics that play an important role, i.e. public opinion.  
Despite what has just been said, public opinion’s power to shape a country’s foreign 
policy is limited, it is important to acknowledge its appearance as an important player. More 
than that, now it is mandatory to relate it to, as Gordon said, the modern means of 
communication. The picture in Tiananmen Square, for example, started a set of 
demonstrations around the world and did set the tone of governmental actions from there on. 
The recent events we call Arab Spring, as well, would not be possible without the individuals 
and their capacity of sharing pictures through the internet, and although there were several 
other political issues involved, public opinion acted as a primary player on this international 
phenomena, something we cannot understand or explain unless we look at the international 
system with new eyes. 
The third institution is an important institution, both because it will unfold one of the 
most significant discussions on the article, but especially because it is the one that mostly 
changed throughout the years. War.  
Since Thucydides and on, war has set the tone of the development of international 
relations theory. Before contextualizing war on the non-state centric view of the world I have 
been drawing in the last pages, I want to discuss a little bit about its relation with International 
Relations Theory and its development.  
In the beginning of the essay, I said International Relations theory was not capable of 
comprising globalization and explaining it and the world after it in a proper way. That is a lie. 
After globalization theory turns close to consensus nowadays, and it explains well the changes 
the world has been going through, the potential behind it, the new actors. Triggered by 
Rosenau and other pioneers, International Relations Theory developed to become more 
complex and comprehensive, adapted to the world it is supposed to explain. This 




think of economics, corporate networks and even leadership or education. One subject, 
though, and the related matters, have faced a different development, and kept encompassed by 
state centric International Relations theory conservative forces, war and security.  
If we think of International Relations in the last century, though, specifically from 
1950 until today, what we will conclude is that International Relations Analysis and Theory 
has been going around security and war as it main subject and most important phenomena. 
Accounting, as I said before, the importance of theory within the creation of institutions, and 
the way institutions are related to governance, we have the initial simple research question set 
to a more profound level, an even bigger problem, not only related to International Relations 
Theory, but to what theory, and what are the dominant theories, and why.  
The dominant theory within International Relations, the one that shaped what we 
understand as the international system, its premises, institutions and actors, the one 
conservative enough to restrict the growth of new ideas and the one that justifies the 
hypothesis I drew by saying an outdated theory precludes world development. In a simple 
way of saying, this is the theory that grew out of war and security studies. 
Given that short reflection, we shall go back to war and security. As an institution, war 
relates to International Relations theory in a variety of subjects. Geopolitics, security, 
weapons development, diplomatic efforts, leagues, alliances, all of those are instances in 
which countries have to deal with issues, risks and those are taken seriously. Sovereignty, as 
well, comes as an important subject. All of those are taken care of within international 
institutions – strengthening my previous comment -, and, thus, we may conclude war and 
security are very much related to, in chain, institutions, foreign policy and diplomacy. This is 
a game to be played, though, within the state centric paradigm created by the old international 
relations theory. 
By bringing war and security to a non-state centric worldview, we are able to broaden 
the understanding of the issues related to it. There is a relevant bad consequence, though, 
thinking thoroughly. Is that both war and security issues become harder to understand and 
manage. It is, however, useful to understand what a different paradigm would allow us to 
view. Considering the globalized world as the subject of study, the first thing to pop out is the 
arousal of new issues. Privacy, food security, climate change, immigration and etc. become 
main issues of security. They do not superpose issues related to nuclear weapons or terrorism, 
although especially nuclear weaponry, as it becomes globalized, loses danger, as no 
government is really eager to use it. The difference is that considering expanded worldview 




the mitigation of problems in a global level, where everybody feels responsible, everybody is 
affected and everybody needs to act. I may state this is not an urge for global acting on 
security issues, as, according to what I said previously, the nation state division of the world 
is not even likely to disappear. The end of the nation state is not a desired condition. The 
analysis of the world in a decentralized way is, though, of much importance, especially if we 
are eager to develop efficient institutions and tackle world problems effectively. 
The last institution I want to talk about is Borders. Although it is a very important 
institution, especially to understand on the state centric theoretical scope, what I mainly want 
to assess is the way it loosens in a globalized world. Beyond that, how do individuals, 
empowered by globalization, go through borders? 
What defines borders, then? It’s usual to think of borders as the imaginary lines that 
shred the world into countries. This comes with lots of assumptions. A border creates the 
limits of a sovereign country. Ultimately, borders restrict not only the territory comprised 
between them, but also the identity, culture and languages, in a sense that even people 
recognize themselves as nationals, as we come to the sense of where they were born (Khana, 
2009). A border encompasses laws, customs, a political system and an economical growth 
space, measured by numbers and predictions. There is nothing new on this, though.  
Some ideas on how globalization has loosened the borders of the world have arisen, 
and this is the point I want to discuss. I shall present two authors, who will both be basis on 
this article. Although their idea on this very same relationship between globalization and 
borders is quite different, I may try to use their both explanations to cover my hypothesis. 
The first point of view comes from Badie. He argues that globalization destroys the 
rules of social and distributive justice (Badie, 2008). In this sense, frontiers of states are not 
frontiers of solidarity between people.  This makes possible to state that there are possibilities 
that people abroad feel more proximate through political-religious solidarities than they do 
with people living near them in the same territory. It’s the spoken “end of the 
territory”.(Albert, David, & Lapid, 2001). In this different way of viewing borders, some 
interpersonal relations acquire a more important role within International Relations. The 
number of students going abroad, the quantity of imported movies (and other items of 
culture), the work of missionaries around today’s world and many other international 
phenomena shall arise as indexes and indicators that can help understand the world.  
The second point of view comes from Parag Khanna (2009). He argues that although 
it looks like we live in a borderless world, especially when it comes to economy and 




understand international phenomena and to understand political insurgence. What he calls 
postcolonial entropy is the movement of countries being created on the very core of other 
countries, it’s the consequences of the colonial divisions created by western civilizations, that 
arises to create quarrels and fights for autonomy, insufflated by the existing borders. It is 
important to take his point of view into account, in order to understand two things: at first, 
when I say institutions are destined to fail because of the obsolete theory they base upon, I am 
not predicting their end, but the need of a different approach.  This goes very well with 
borders. Following Khanna’s point of view, there is much more to look for at borders than 
what is usually set. Secondly, in spite of the fact that borders derive from an obsolete 
theoretical model, their existence is an asset for international relations, and has to be assessed, 
although in a modern way, which considers, for example, Badie’s thoughts. 
Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War and Borders, thus, play a very important role for the 
understanding of international relations. Having considered new approaches and 
understanding methods for them, thus, is the first step into creating solutions for the 
aforementioned structural problems within the building of institutions. Flowing through new 
theoretical ways of analyzing the world, I believe we have created a streamlined path to what 
the rest of the article is going to be.  
To enhance the discussion, then, there are three important authors I have to write 
about. Bertrand Badie, Kenichi Ohmae and James Rosenau. At this point, there is an 
important comment I want to make. As I said, there is no lack of new theory within 
international relations analysis. Theory is being developed to address every single change the 
world suffers. Why, then, would I be writing on the obsoleteness of theory? More than that, 
why would I use two 2 decades old books to describe a problem with contemporary analysis 
of International Relations?9 As stated by my hypothesis, I believe contemporary institutions 
are much more affected by and have been created through the analysis and usage of old 
theory.  In this sense, although economical trends of global analysis and other sectors of 
international affairs are quite updated about the world, even within theory, institutions are not. 
Institutions are still using the same old parameters theorists used when they first discussed 
international relations. For that reason, I believe using Rosenau and Kenichi’s books has a 
very important meaning. Both authors had innovative views of the world, and their ideas 
helped shape our understanding of what the world currently is like. But why weren’t their 
ideas used to build the tools we use to operate global governance, our institutions? Why are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




governments, international organizations, international law and so many other institutions still 
trapped within conservative state centric assumptions? That takes me back to the research 
question. Now that we know what the problem is, the question on the reason why the world 
has gotten so hard to understand seems simple. The institutions we try to use to understand it 
and tackle its issues are just not equipped with the right analytical tools. If so, why didn’t 
decision makers and representatives act to comply with it? This will be more discussed as the 
article goes by. 
For now, I want to set some ideas from the three mentioned authors, and compare 
them with my hypothesis, in order to build a solid theoretical outline for the research. 
At first let us assess James Rosenau’s book. In order to position his work on this 
essay’s hypothesis, I may use three themes he chooses to explain his own theory, which are: 
1) Considering this era to be a historical breakpoint; 2) Assuming a bifurcation of macro 
global structures into what he calls “the two worlds of world politics” and 3) focus on the 
micro level and the hypothesis that the analytic and emotional skills of adults in every country 
are increasing.  
On his first claim, I may take some points into consideration. Rosenau’s work posed a 
very strong influence on that generation of international relations scholars. He would refer, as 
well as I do, to technologic advancements as tools that changed the very core of international 
relations, interfering on the way we would understand the decisions, phenomena, the impact 
they had and the actors involved. From the moment he published his book to today, two 
decades later, technology development increased exponentially. If Rosenau was astonished 
with what communications could do then, and thought that could make difference in how 
International Relations phenomena happened, I can only imagine what he would say after 
questioned on the advent of smartphones and similar technologies we have access to now. 
What is important to say is that the feature of being a historical breakpoint (and thereby, 
needing theory to update) is not so strong anymore, and not an excuse for being outdated. 
Other areas of knowledge have advanced and the fact that institutions are obsolete 
considering the world they lie in is a flaw. Why didn’t the development of institutions follow 
the trend started by Rosenau, then? In a fairer sentence, why are they taking so much to adapt 
completely? Only to state my own idea, I believe considering any era a historical breakpoint 
is exaggerated. It encompasses the idea that theories shape the world, and not the inverse, as 
theory needs to change to explain the world.  
The second theme comprises a very important similarity to my own theory.  Rosenau 




decentralizing and centralizing dynamics, caused by demographic and resource changes, 
postindustrial order changes and microelectronic revolution related changes. The still state 
centric world has to deal with new variables, mostly non-state variables. In this sense, after 
1970, according to Rosenau, global structures change from within, by pressures of authority 
crises; the growth of subgroups; the weakened systems; the increased relevance of subgroups; 
the new regimes; the new transnational issues and the expanded analytics of individuals and 
officials, in order to become a divided globe, of two political worlds. A first state centric 
world composed of the two powers, the 3rd world, subgroups, and international governmental 
and non-governmental organizations. A second multi-centric world comprised of subgroups, 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations, state bureaucracies and 
transnational actors. My idea is basically the same. In my opinion, institutions do live in this 
first world of politics he describes. They try to deal with problems from the second world 
using a first-world approach. In addition, they can’t follow the advances and new 
opportunities the second-world raises, as they are hindered by a state-centric bias. An extra 
critic I pose is that although Rosenau and I use this model to explain relations within the 
world, nothing restricts the world itself to it. Such theoretical models are not necessarily the 
way the world operates exactly. There could be, for example, a multi-centric worldview and 
approach during ancient ages, as even the concept of a nation state is relatively new. This may 
be too much meta-theoretical. 
On the third theme, the links between the micro and macro world occupy a central 
place on Rosenau’s work. He hypothesizes a continuous process of interaction between them. 
Then he tries to find its implications. He turns the problem of the micro-macro interaction into 
an opportunity. To Rosenau, focusing on the interactions between the levels enables one to 
get to the core of global life, to the ways in which large, impersonal forces at work in the 
world both derive from and influence the actions of people in coping with challenges and 
conducting their affairs. The micro-macro opportunity amounts to nothing less than a means 
for treating world affairs as the affairs of people, who aspire, fear, avoid, compete and behave 
in the organizations that clash and converge on the global stage. He diverges from realism and 
Marxism, as both consider individuals as consequences, instead of sources of macro-level 
institutions and collectivities. This goes along with my hypothesis, as well, as I believe the 
lack of new actors is the main flaw of the state-centric theory that bases the outdated 
institutions of the world. 
After Rosenau, I may relate my hypothesis to the work of Bertrand Badie. There are, 




The first reason is that he focuses his assessment on one of the institutions I chose to 
study. Although a first glimpse on the fact makes you think this restricts the usage of Badie’s 
work, it does not. On his work, in order to criticize the way Diplomacy is understood and 
carried out, he goes through all of the theoretical bases and explores them to their core, in 
order to understand where the flaw is. On the beginning of his work, Badie argues how 
diplomacy, and other international related activities, still restricts the participation of 
individuals. He explains how this had been a trend for the whole political sphere, which 
democracy helped tear away. The international scenario resisted, though, and till today, 
individuals are yet not recognized as actors or participants of the international system’s 
phenomena. On Badie’s opinion, though, it is not possible, in today’s work, to limit us to a 
narrow definition of diplomacy, reduced to the art of interstate negotiation, under the risk of 
considering it outdated. He invites diplomacy, then, to become the art of responding every 
problem associated to the effects of separation and distinction between spaces of proclaimed 
sovereignty. In this sense, Diplomacy acquires the role of managing, within the international 
scenario, both representative functions and communication. In that case, Diplomacy becomes 
social, as with its actors.  This kind of change, as Badie argues, poses the need to rebuild all 
of the view we have over whatever is international. Considering, thus, that it is undeniable 
that globalization forces diplomacy to attract new economic, cultural, religious and other 
partners; that globalization forces the state diplomats to have to develop a sociological 
reading of the challenges, beyond the traditional strategic readings, the challenge Badie poses 
is that one needs to understand why so much energy has been spent on the attempt to keep 
diplomacy out of this social contamination.  
The second reason is the strong sociological bias of Badie’s work. He starts by citing 
two of the father authors who influenced international relations theoretical development, 
Grotius and Hobbes. Both were influenced by the happenings in their times, as expected, 
according to Badie. Grotius, as a counselor for the Eastern Indian Company, had developed 
his ideas within the context of the growth of the maritime trade. Starting from Grotius ideas, 
going through Durkheim, the sociological view would emphasize the importance of the civil 
societies and peoples, besides adopting a different, less institutionalized view of democracy. 
Nonetheless, the end of the 30-Years War and the British civil war influenced Hobbes. 
According to Badie, what happened is that although the confrontation is still present, the ideas 
of the author of the Leviathan predominated. Sovereignty and powers triumphed as tools to 
understand a world in imminent chaos and that, thus, needed security related institutions. The 




is a world in which order and reason are dominant, in which the Prince is granted powers over 
the lives of his subjects in times in which he had to deal with other Princes, always enemies, 
always gladiators. Still today this is the dominant vision within universities and chancelleries, 
although it has been developed and enriched itself with modern ideas.  
According to Badie, though, the contrast of the two scholarships dominates political 
science, as he differs a classical realist approach and the sociology of international relations. 
To the extent of the hypothesis shown in this article, the sociological view is to be the most 
important, as it represents the institutional innovation I believe the world, the universities and 
the institutions need. Following Badie’s thoughts, I may expand my hypothesis to say that in 
case the institutions of today don’t use a sociological approach to recognize the participation 
of individuals within the international arena, they may be restricted to a martial and state 
centric view of international relations, that will certainly preclude the choice of the righteous 
decisions and may guide to deep flaws and mistakes within the analysis of international 
relations, as globalization is the reality of today’s world.  
The third reason is very simple. If you consider Rosenau and Kenichi wrote about the 
subject we are discussing 20 years ago, you might say theory and the world should have 
adapted to it by now. I don’t believe so. And having Bertrand Badie write about the same 
issues not far from today is a strong argument to say that international relations theory and the 
way we address institutions and paradigms are outdated, indeed. This strengthens my 
hypothesis. 
The last author I want to present, as one of the sources of the kind of thought that 
generated this article is Kenichi Ohmae. Although Kenichi’s work focuses on the economic 
world I have already attested has enough theoretical tools to deal with a globalized world, he 
poses some assumptions and challenges to that first world Rosenau draws, the world of the 
nation states, and his conclusions and inquisitions are very important for us to understand and 
draw the contribution of this article both to science and to society.  
Kenichi starts by saying that traditional nation states have become unnatural, even 
impossible, business units in a global economy. He argues that although government leaders 
believed the new phenomena within the international world (including, ill-starred 
conventional war, a nuclear holocaust, nuclear disasters and etc.) would not affect the entities 
they oversaw [the nation states], they were wrong. Kenichi states the forces now at work have 




aggregates in terms of which to think about within economic activity10. Many of the core 
values supporting a world order based on discrete, independent nation states, have shown 
themselves in serious need of redefinition or, perhaps, replacement. (Kenichi, 1996) 
In order to explain a little of Kenichi’s work, let us take, for instance, the four “I’s” he 
uses to describe his own mind flow. The first “I” is investment. Kenichi affirms it is no longer 
geographically constrained. Apart from being mostly private money, investment money 
comes and goes where the good opportunities are, breaking the logic of having a country’s 
economy closed to it. Governments needn’t be involved in it anymore, even if the money 
comes, i.e. from pension funds of public money. This attests the freedom of choice of actors 
within the international arena, which means they have to be considered within international 
phenomena, if we consider investments to be one of the main forces of international relations, 
as Kenichi does. 
The second “I”, industry, is also far more global in orientation today than it was a 
decade ago. Whilst most ideas within industry attraction may say governments attract 
industries by giving them tax diminutions and other benefits, Kenichi affirms corporations 
move to other countries because they believe there is where their future lies. On the same 
rationale, technology and know-how transfer are not gifts big companies give to states, but 
necessary tools they need to make their operation work. The meaning of this is that industry is 
not anymore constrained to the reasons of state, but, rather, by the desire and need to serve 
attractive markets wherever they exist and to tap attractive pools of resources wherever they 
sit. This is important to understand private actors are not subservient actors defined by what 
state actors tell. They are borderless agents.  
The third “I”, information technology, is said to facilitate the movement of both 
investment and industry. What it has done, in summary, is creating the possibility of 
allocating capability from one place to the other without the needing of moving or creating 
new structures. This means a company in Oregon can control the production in Malaysia, and 
wherever else it is needed. The theoretical meaning of this is that there is a boost in the 
capability of private actors to act within international arenas, a boost states do not count 
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  acquires	  a	  much	  stronger	  meaning	  if	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  conference	  of	  
leading	  CEOs	  held	  in	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  back	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with11 . This increases the scalability of action of non-governmental actors within the 
international arena and means their influence can grow much faster and broader than the 
influence of states. 
The fourth “I” is individual consumers. According to Kenichi, they have become more 
global as the access to information increased. In this sense, it is likely that they will become 
pickier to choose for the products they want, and will not care where they come from 
anymore, as long as they are the better options. 
These four “I’s” give an overview on Kenichi’s work, and put us in a position to relate 
it to the given hypothesis given. The first conclusion Kenichi draws is that, within the context 
of these four “I’s”, viable economic units in any part of the world can pull in whatever is 
needed for development. They do not need to look for assistance to pools of resources close to 
home, nor need they rely on the formal efforts of governments to attract resources from 
elsewhere12. In this sense, the “middleman” function of governments is unnecessary. This is 
enough material (as the works of both Rosenau and Badie are) to prove my hypothesis true. 
Nevertheless, I believe there are some comments to make on behalf of it, as some 
considerations.  
Kenichi’s ideas describe very well how the new economic flows should cover the 
world, regardless of borders. When it comes to the institutions, though, I believe there is 
space for some limits on Kenichi’s ideas. Although it is known states need not be the only 
actors on international sphere, they need not disappear, as well. On my hypothesis, I believe, 
as Kenichi, the theoretical assumptions behind institutions are outdated. The solution I want 
to provide, though, is an expansion on the institutions’ core, not a complete extermination of 
borders and nations. I may state Kenichi did not forecast that, as well, but his focus on the 
uselessness of the state centric worldview is not compliant with the double worldview I want 
to provide within Rosenau’s theory, for instance.  
Nevertheless, there is a scholarship that may have developed Kenichi’s idea to an 
insight within the institutional world, which is Benjamin Barber’s. Barber affirms that 
considering the international arena as an arena whereby problems have to be solved, the 
executive powers within nations are not the right ones to access if one wants to tackle global 
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  Unless	  you	  look	  into	  smarter	  cities	  solutions	  designed	  by	  big	  corporations.	  They	  are	  
designed	  to	  give	  mayors	  and	  other	  government	  representatives	  the	  tools	  to	  deal	  with	  
globalization	  in	  a	  city	  scope,	  for	  instance.	  
12	  An	  important	  remark	  from	  Kenichi’s	  work	  is	  how	  he	  proves	  states	  have	  used	  and	  




issues effectively. This is closely related to Kenichi’s idea of a regional business unit13. What 
Barber says, nonetheless, is that on shall access mayors of cities, whom he calls problem-
solvers, to help tackle these global issues. If you consider cities are the battlefields where 
global issues are really inflicting their consequences and from where action needs to be taken, 
Barber’s idea makes sense. In my opinion, though, one shall not take nation states out of the 
equation, although, they need not be the main actors nor the only. 
Another insight that may be interesting, considering Kenichi’s economical concepts 
on the globalized world, is Mariana Mazzucato’s. Whilst Kenichi writes for the need of states 
to back off from international economic chains and financial flows of investment, Mazzucato 
goes in the contrary way. She has studied the investments held within innovation and 
scientific development, highly connected to the communication technology the world created 
in the past decades, and concluded the nation states were the main actor within the whole 
process. Risk investments – the ones that have reached the cutting edge technology we brag 
about today – are not within the investments taken by private companies. States do fund them, 
though. Without the help from nation states no technological innovation would have been 
possible, she says. In this sense, my opinion is that far from taking states out of the 
international analysis equation, we have to approach the opportunities even states are taken 
within with a different eye. Looking at the state with an old theoretical view, even if it has an 
important strategic role within the international system, will not conduct to new outcomes 
within analysis, and will probably lead to unpredictability and theoretical flaws. If we take the 
state and sum it up with new actors to understand the new world we live in, there will be two 
paths, in my opinion. The first path will lead to the discovery that there is no analytical 
capacity to understand everything the world is available to produce as potential, and that there 
probably will not be. The second path, though, may recognize movements not yet recognized 
within international system analysis, like religion, social entrepreneurship, ill-dispersion, 
scholarships for students and social media, as important movements within the international 
arena, that need to be understood and considered in order to create an accurate understanding 
of the world, as international relations theory is supposed to. This is the contribution I want to 
make, and that will prove to be needed, in case my hypothesis is proven right. 
The reader may criticize my theoretical approach for a global world by saying the 
authors I picked may probably lead to a westernized view of the world. This is right. There 
are limits on my approach, as well. To diminish them, though, I may state how the ideas of 
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  A	  concept	  many	  corporations	  use	  nowadays,	  in	  change	  from	  the	  old	  nation	  state	  




Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Dambisa Moyo and Dalia Mogahed also comply with my hypothesis, 
in an effort to turn the chosen “biased” points of view into real insights on the world. 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is the first female Finance Minister of Nigeria. During a lecture 
in 2007, she described what her ministry and the government itself had been working on in 
order to guarantee the development of the country. Although most of what she says relates 
directly to what Kenichi states on his work, by drawing some nuances on Mazzucato’s ideas 
and the hypothesis, one may understand my point of view. To keep it simple, she describes 
how they privatized companies, liberalized some sectors and conducted their finances 
properly, in a way that the country’s economical development raised significantly, whereby 
also available services to people and the quality of those services grew in the same pace.  
Investments came from abroad, multinational corporations were added to the roll of 
companies in the country, information technology became available and people started to 
create their own companies and choose the products they wanted. That would be an 
assessment if we take into account Kenichi’s work. Using Mazzucato’s point of view, though, 
would indicate how much of the efforts to grant this development was government inducted. 
The role of the state was immense, and the government, which assured the necessary stability 
for companies and money to come, tackled problems like corruption and the messy financial 
system. More than that, the existent public-private partnership, that had to deal with the 
international system in both global and regional scopes, is a reason to believe innovational 
alternatives exist for tackling old problems. The State took itself out of problems it could not 
deal with (it’s important to state it was not coped to do so), and let other actors take control.  
Okonjo-Iweala opened the door for a new way of thinking Africa, a way that considers 
the opportunities within the country, considering the people inside it. This is a worldview 
indexes like the GDP per capita would never comply with, but that may represent the new 
wave of investment and entrepreneurship in the world. 
The Zambian-born international economist Dambisa Moyo, chosen by Times as one of 
the 100 most influential people in the world, has an opinion that may also help cope with the 
goal of diminishing the western bias of the article. In a lecture in June, this year of 2013, 
Dambisa addresses a very uncommon trend, for westerners. She starts by asking whether 
liberal democratic states are the real solution for growing economies. Although the 
combination between private capitalism, liberal democracy and prioritized political rights 
may be a sacred mix for the western world, she says, the western world represents only 10% 
of the world’s population. In emerging countries, the idol of development, the model that 




de-emphasized democracy and prioritized economic rights reigns, in contradiction with the 
western model. People worry more about where life standard improvements come from than 
about whether they can or not vote. Moyo states democracy is not a pre-requisite for 
economic growth, although economic growth may be a pre-requisite for democracy.  
Taking Moyo’s opinion into account certainly diminishes any westernized biases into 
the essay, especially because she directly defies the self-given authority of western States to 
try to spread a government model around the world. This opens doors for considerations 
much more related to the globalized world I am trying to describe, like the ascension of social 
businesses models14, the importance of public opinion, the importance of religion founded 
biases in public opinion, the capacity of governments to really improve life standard in the 
short term. 
Although this seems to relate very few with the theme of the article, there is a direct 
reason why I chose to put it here. The first reason is that, according to Moyo, a recent study 
found out that the very average income of people into a country is the main reason why a 
democracy shall last. The higher the income average, the longer the democracy is. This 
explains and proves the acknowledgement of the importance of micro actors within the macro 
environment. By coping with Rosenau’s theory, Moyo helps bring a different view into the 
article, and I won’t take her idea for granted. 
Dalia Mogahed, former Executive Director of Gallup’s Center for Muslim Studies and 
CEO of Mogahed Consulting, on a lecture in 2012, gives an assessment on what sparked the 
Arab Spring. Nevertheless she gives some extraordinary facts on the views of people during 
the Arab Springs, due to her research experience at Gallup15; there are two important facts 
about her lecture I want to elaborate on. 
The first fact is that she goes in the opposite direction of Moyo’s theory. By showing 
data on people’s opinions she correlates the Arab Spring to a desire (using Egyptians’ 
opinions as the asset) on having freedom and democracy, in a western style.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Which	  are	  models	  that	  seek	  to	  tackle	  the	  base	  of	  the	  income	  pyramid	  for	  profit,	  in	  an	  
effort	  to	  create	  social	  impact.	  (Yunus,	  2008)	  
15	  For	  instance,	  she	  concludes	  the	  rise	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  Arab	  countries	  is	  not	  related	  
with	  secularization,	  but	  with	  human	  development	  indexes,	  contrary	  to	  western	  
thoughts,	  which	  would	  mainly	  go	  against	  Islamism.	  Also,	  she	  describes	  how	  women’s	  
opinions	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  religion	  on	  law	  are	  not	  related	  between	  countries.	  This	  
means	  women’s	  opinions	  are	  not	  subjects	  of	  their	  condition	  of	  being	  women,	  but	  on	  
their	  conditions	  as	  nationals.	  The	  importance	  of	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  facts	  is	  that	  they	  are	  concurrent	  




The second fact is that as she uses people’s opinions to design the upheavals on the 
Arab Spring, she also opens doors for a microanalysis within the macro structure, which, 
according to Rosenau, has to be the main source for an analytical international relations study. 
Again, assessments like Mogahed’s are the kind of assessment on international relations that 
do create understanding on the world, in a globalized environment, as we know the world is 
now. This relates with my hypothesis, as Moyo’s, Mogahed’s and Okonjo-Iweala’s assess the 
world and the international phenomena in a non-state centric way, so that their assessments 
are updated. They also ratify my hypothesis as they present non-state centric views in order to 
provide real assessments on conclusions state centric views have misunderstood, proving old 
state centric view to be destined to fail and to have created institutions with embedded flaws 
in them. 
More than that, though, taking these three thoughts into consideration ensures the 
attempt to make this article less westernized, Eurocentric or biased in any way. I may state, 
though, there are constraints to this attempt, and there will probably be westernized bias in the 
essay, as even my own background may have been influenced by it. 
Although I did state that the necessary theory to understand the world is not available 
yet, as the full range of interactions and possibilities of the world is too wide, I believe an 
attempt to use some different analytical tools is important to create at least a clearer view. In 
this sense, I may present what the analytical tools I want to use are, so that the reader knows 
what I may base upon to make my discovery process alive.  
In this sense, I may briefly present five theories that I want to use to describe the 
world in a more innovative way. They are not enough, as well as they are not complete. They 
may, although, serve to goal of providing a different analysis, that encompasses more 
variables and possibilities than the old theoretical tools available for the analysis of 
international phenomena within the theme of institutions and the presented paradigms. 
“I believe it has the power to end the gridlock created by conflicting 
ideas, which appears to be paralyzing the globalized world. Reality is so 
complex it is mandatory to move away from dogma.” 
— Glattfelder, James B.16 
This quote from a TEDx Conference is about what the first theory I want to present is 
capable of, in the words of one of its authors. The reader should feel free to take his/her own 
conclusion whether Glattfelder is right or not.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The first theory I want to present, than, is the Science of Complexity.(Glattfelder, 
Vitali, & Battiston, The network of global corporate control, 2011) A complex system is a 
system made up of many interconnected and interacting parts, as the individuals in the globe. 
Complex systems are very hard to map into mathematical equations, in a way that a 
quantitative analysis would be very hard to accomplish. The interesting thing is that complex 
behavior is actually the result of a few simple rules of interaction. In this sense, it is possible 
to understand the system through the interactions. Most Complex Systems also share a feature 
called emergence, which means the system as a whole suddenly starts to show a behavior, 
which cannot be understood or predicted by looking at the components of the system. So the 
whole is literally more than the sum of its parts. In this sense, there is opportunity to 
understand the system without analyzing each individual on it, but only the rules of 
interaction. This makes possible to use the Science of Complexity to analyze the international 
system with individuals as actors, as we can create networks.  
Analyzing the international system as a network may open doors to discover, i.e., how 
to deal with potential pandemics, as we may analyze the flying patterns, or to gather 
information on how individuals can influence political decisions, how they share knowledge, 
how innovation is driven, how trade and foreign trade or financial flows go on and etc. 
Although this kind of analysis is not capable of providing details on individuals and their 
choices, it may broaden our understanding on the relation between the macro and micro 
spheres. It may, for example, transform diplomacy into a tool for individuals, as Badie claims 
in the conclusion of his book, whether individuals are aware of it or not. If we consider 
diplomacy to be the communications tool of the globalized world, it is mandatory to 
understand how the involved individuals on this network of communication interact. We can 
open doors for new rules of interaction and for new possibilities, as we study the network 
itself. The paradigms of sovereignty and actions like intervention and aid would acquire a 
whole different significance, as we become more aware of how individuals interact and share 
between themselves, and how this can impact the world. Network analysis can help us 
discover who or which are the hubs where individuals and decisions gather, and this can bring 
a new path of developing for the science of decision making. Also, it may become easier to 
coordinate global issues tackling as we can predict interactions and even boost interactions 
that can solve the issue in question.  
If you take foreign policy, as decision processes are streamlined and the influences can 
be measured between the different involved groups and networks, there may be enough 




decisions are taken may depend less on discourse analysis and become less obscure, as the 
science of complexity broadens the discussion and takes systems as a whole. Systems may 
hold more significance than the representatives that carry them out and outcomes may involve 
more people, so that even international law, for example, may be operated and executed in a 
smoother way, with more people aware of it, as we may study how to broadcast news and 
laws in a more effective way. 
War, security and global issues may be better tackled, as it may become possible to 
understand where problems come from and who or which are the hubs and the controlling 
individuals. I am not saying the Science of complexity has the solution for all the problems in 
the planet, but assuming it treats information without getting stuck on different opinions, there 
may be space for the generation of new insights.  
Borders, the same way, may have a different significance, as we go from studying its 
geopolitical limits to exploring how their existence relates to the flows of people, knowledge, 
money and goods, as well as diseases and other interchangeable matters. Imagining the 
possibilities of studying individuals as networks is interesting as we may be able to, e.g., 
study how people’s genealogical trees may relate with their nationalities. Strategic 
investments may be created as new hubs are discovered, and new actors may ascend, as well.  
There are limits to this kind of exploration, though. Assessments and analyzes may be 
too shallow and may be biased, as criteria becomes broader to analyze more and more agents 
and rules on the complex systems. Even with restrictions, though, Science of Complexity may 
be a good alternative into understanding how individuals compose the network that acts to 
become the international system itself, and how they are, or not, important to it. 
Another theory that is important for the creation of a new assessment on international 
relations comes from Maria Helena de Castro Santos, or, even before, from Graham T. 
Allison. Although they write about very different subjects, it is interesting as both their 
theories have an analogue conclusion. While Allison writes about the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
for instance, Santos writes about Biofuels quarrels in Brazil, 30 years later. They both 
describe mechanisms of decision taking, though. Allison describes three models through 
which decision can be taken. Of the three, the third is going to be important to us (also 
because it’s the one the author identifies with). On Allison’s third model, the first premise is 
that there is no rational in decision-making. According to Allison, the political environment is 
comprised of lots of directly and not directly involved individuals, groups and organizations 
that discuss, quarrel and measure their influences. As debate goes by, some influences matter 




resultant force of the sum of the various different vectors, as in physics. Castro Santos, 
similarly, describes how important it is to identify the involved agents and to get to know 
what are their intentions and interests. After that, Santos states the political analyst shall infer 
who wins and loses with each possible outcome, on which basis it is possible to discover how 
the different actors will deal with the discussions. With that in mind, it is important to assess 
the power and influence of each involved actor and, then, it is possible to predict what the 
outcome will be. Nevertheless predictions are possible, the real outcome of political 
discussions is never known until it comes, as the political quarrels are not rational, again.  
Before applying these theories to the international system I want to draw, and, more 
than that, to the paradigms I chose for analysis, I may make some comments on them. At first, 
I believe they are exaggerations on the reality. Although considering politics to be a 
completely rational procedure accomplished by the union of economical men is a big illusion, 
considering it to be completely empty of reason is also an exaggeration. The structures where 
the actors and organizations are embedded have rules and the interaction between them is 
limited at some points. In this sense, and also considering the limits posed by morals, 
religions, political scandals and the law, there is reason in the political decision-making 
process. The point, though, is to keep balance between what an economic-man rationale may 
bring as an outcome, and what a Hobbesian state of chaos-like decision-making process is 
capable of. Another insight is that, although both theories are decades old, they certainly are 
not the way mainstream theory looks upon decision-making process. In this sense, they are 
innovative, as they represent the other side from the most used theory, and, thus, balance is 
required to create innovation. 
In this sense, as we analyze the international globalized world, especially as we put the 
two different worlds described by Rosenau at stake, figuring out how decision making 
processes work can be surprising. Whilst the first world is opened up by the emergence of 
actors not considered before, and outcomes as the keeping of subsidies or the giving of 
scholarship money overseas becomes more lucid, the second world may look like what a 
stock exchange room in 1940’s Wall Street looked like, complete chaos, risk taking and few 
input data decision-making. What I mean is that, as it is known from the corporate world, 
most decisions are made with less information than needed. Therefore, there is high risk in 
almost every decision, and, beyond that, as information is not the same for every actor 
involved of the discussion, there are quarrels, there is deceiving and there is bribery. There is 
also fruitful discussion and most of the involved people are probably well intended during 




chambers of decision-making, for example the UN and the WTO. After imagining how the 
discussions go on and concluding they are not as rational as theory makes it look like, it 
seems logic that most documents and treaties do not pose significant changes or obligations to 
any of the parts. It also opens the mind for the new opportunities, as new actors may get 
involved and influence the procedures. Even demonstrations outside of those chambers start 
making sense, and cases like the Blood Diamonds case or the Kony 2012 viral videos around 
the web seem more likely to happen and to make difference, as we imagine the representative 
teams and involved institutions are comprised of people as that can be influenced by those 
activities. 
If we take diplomacy, then, under analysis, there is much to infer about it under this 
new sphere of analysis. At first, as we take the usual actors into stake, this different point of 
view brings some new insights into the diplomacy formulation process. At first, it becomes 
mandatory to consider the many national involved actors in order to understand diplomacy 
made by representatives abroad. In this sense, diverse ministries, foreign affairs councils 
within national organizations, corporations and civil society representatives have influence 
over the diplomacy held for representatives. In this sense, the diplomat must both make a 
sociological analysis of the needs of the country, rather than a strategic only analysis, and 
comply with the democratic (or not democratic) methods of decision-making within the 
country. In this sense, diplomatic communication is much more legitimate, and much more 
mistake-proof, as well. The embedded problem is that this assessment makes it mandatory 
that the diplomat is aware of all of this. In some, maybe even most of the cases, the diplomat 
will not be. In this sense, the representative may draw diplomacy as commanded by higher 
authorities and/or his own opinions on the needs of the country, depending on how much 
empowered he or she is to do that. To counter that, it would be clever to create a pool of 
decisions or even analysis of big data on the opinions and needs of different instances of 
national administration and private actors (as submitting every decision to keen analysis by 
several representatives and other actors would be time-consuming), in a way that diplomats 
can be backed by analysis done over real concerns and needs from different actors, so that the 
discussion is simulated and they are able to take better decisions.  
On another way of viewing it, namely Badie’s theory, private actors and individuals 
are part of diplomacy, whether they are aware of that or not. Considering the decision-making 
process described, the ones aware of it would most likely, but not necessarily, influence 
diplomacy and their countries’ effectiveness on the international arena. In addition, the 




jeopardy, as their beliefs and interests can be better screened and subjects of other instances’ 
analysis. The real process, though, is not making them part of it (although that may be needed 
in some cases), but making them aware of it and recognizing their already existent 
contribution, in order to create possibilities for the micro-macro analysis proposed by 
Rosenau, and to boost the effectiveness of actions as to Kenichi.  
Analyzing the effects of diplomacy on the abroad arena, as well, reveals new insights 
as the balanced decision-making process is considered. Conjuncture, for example, becomes a 
wider concept, as it may include public opinion as a main actor, and, surprisingly, as one of 
the main assets of diplomats, as they can be used to improve the effectiveness of impact of 
decisions, as media can be used to broadcast whatever diplomats say.  
Foreign Policy, on its side, follows the same rational used to understand the creation 
of Diplomacy under the new decision-making theory, although the outcomes must be 
broadened to cover more than communication, to become the reflection of a countries own 
quarrels and disputes, in an attempt to become a single voice. The question I want to pose is: 
Why does a country need a single voice? We have already considered the importance of 
dispute to build policy. Why then, should so many actors agree to narrow their opinions to a 
single blow if the world encompasses so many possibilities and still uncovered interaction 
potential? One might argue that international discussion and governance chambers are not for 
undecided actors, but why do the decisions held in those places need single representatives? Is 
not one of the main problems of the discussion on those chambers the absence of some 
important players? What if countries were not required to act solely?  
This question is far beyond an irrational desire for decentralization, though. It goes to 
the very core of the political decisions held both within a country and to its capability to hold 
them abroad. If one remembers the first assumptions of this essay, it may become clearer. The 
balanced decision-taking theory is not a suggestion on how the decisions should be taken, but 
a perceived better explanation on how decisions are actually held. This means foreign policy 
building is not a process held by sole representatives. This also means international treaties 
are not created after rational debate by enlightened prime ministers and diplomats. Although 
comprised by structures, the conjuncture and the emergence of private or individual actors 
already make difference to both mentioned spheres. This is proved by the power of lobbying, 
for example. The path, then, goes from suggesting a new way to do policy, to broadening the 
perception of how policy is made. This explains, for instance, why international decisions 
held by state centric based institutions are not always, to say the least, successful. It also 




its walls, in the last years (the US, the BRICS and others can serve as good examples), as 
institutional innovation within national governments has been learning to consider more 
actors faster than international governance institutions. 
When it comes to war, security and other global issues, as well, a decision-making 
process as this one certainly raises concerns, as well as opportunities. If one considers old 
mainstream approaches, for instance, security issues become of most importance, as well as 
International Relations is turned into the science of war. In this world, weapons of mass 
destruction are some of the most important assets a country can have, as well as national 
defense research and development, along with strategic geopolitical action becomes a priority 
both within budget planning and execution. A country is a gladiator within a roman plaza, and 
must be prepared to fight at every moment.  In case one takes this as the basis where countries 
interact, a decision-making as mentioned would be too dangerous to deal with. It wouldn’t 
make sense, as the State, in the roman example, is to be an organism, a single actor. 
Nonetheless, we already know that this is simply not true. States are not sole actors that can 
take their decisions apart from conjuncture or other actors’ (even national actors) opinions. 
States are part (an important part, though) of what countries are, and they are composed of 
several actors, their opinions and the structure they are comprised within.  In this sense, 
internal negotiation, following the balanced decision-making theory I described before, 
regarding subjects like security and war, acquire a much higher level of complexity. War, at a 
first glimpse, may probably fade away, flooded by other security issues that go much beyond 
WMD issues. For example17, food security issues, diseases and pandemics related security 
issues, privacy issues, as the ones created by the espionage of the NSA agency, recently 
uncovered by Snowden and other activists, along with many others, gather evidence in the 
international arena, as simple actions perpetrated by individuals are acknowledged as possible 
international phenomena. A decision-making process that includes risk-taking and little 
information availability is, though, still a preoccupation. How should an international analyst 
explain those issues under the light of a balanced decision-making process?  
Although the trend is to say it would be the same process as the process considered in 
the building of diplomacy, as security issues usually require a fast analysis and faster action, it 
is true to say that they should be handled by fewer actors, as if the State could take 
responsibility for acting, as it controls, by law, the logistic chains, the armies, information 
flows and etc. This does not mean, though, that the building of the State’s decisions has to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





made within an oval office. Planning and strategy are to be built the same way any political 
decision goes into the country, and this is not new, as, e.g., medical industries and food 
producers hold a big power on lobby within most countries, and help shape political 
decisions, the way the described decision-making process works. The needed action, though, 
is to recognize them as part of this political process, and as well as part of the equation on 
international phenomena. State representatives, alone, would probably not be able to take any 
decisions regarding, i.e., information security issues, a problem clearly stated by the security 
problem the world faces right now.  
If you take global issues tackling, as well, you will find that state centric strategy is 
seldom the answer to any issue. Benjamin Barber’s work complies with this, as he says 
allowing mayors to take control on global issues tackling is the only way to be effective. In 
my opinion, both regional actors, in a decentralization effort, and the States, should gather, 
and be part of the equation, as States do control important assets, although they may not have 
enough capability for dealing with global issues in a proper way. 
On the subject borders, the important discussion sets on the new possibilities for 
geopolitical governance. For instance, as borders acquire a much broader significance in the 
globalized world, the first appearance is the new assets to encompass into law. Information 
flows, foreign trade, immigration, all the variables that would be analyzed differently within a 
Complex Systems’ analysis, have to be dealt with in political instances as well. Knowing how 
these political decisions take place is, thus, an important asset. The new aspect of this is, 
though, that political decisions about borders, regarding all of the variables above, is that the 
individuals comprised by the border issues may be part of the discussion held, whether it is 
conducted nationally or not. Immigrants may have voice over immigration political decisions, 
as companies become more active considering foreign trade decisions. As Badie said, 
individuals become part of the international system and gather importance within it, as 
problems and issues can be reported to the whole world in an instantaneous click. More than 
that, the micro-macro relation becomes broader as foreigners become eligible to discussions 
not related to their countries, as active actors. Gordon Brown cites an important example 
during a speech delivered in 2009, when bloggers around the world changed their addresses to 
Teheran, Iran, in order to make it difficult for the Iranian security agency to find who the 
dissident bloggers talking about the repression and prosecution going on in the country were. 
Individuals made the difference and precluded State action, within an international 




The third theory I want to present is the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, created by Daniel 
Isenberg, from Babson College. Although Isenberg had created the model to explain how 
entrepreneurs could take action within their societies and improve entrepreneurship chains by 
improving their success rates, I believe the model is a good example on how an individual can 
become an international actor.  
In his model, Isenberg describes how an entrepreneurial ecosystem consists of 
financial institutions, educational institutions, government assistance, other enterprises, 
networking agencies, universities, investors and other instances, and how improving these 
instances alone can augment the chances of creating new entrepreneurs, and enhancing their 
success rates. In this sense, entrepreneurship is not only a function of the entrepreneurs’ sole 
capacity to create and innovate, but also of the ecosystem around him. Also, action can and 
must be taken in order to improve this ecosystem. This means a macro ambience 
improvement, which may create opportunities for micro agents.  
Rosenau can be used to explain two of the assumptions here. The first is that the 
capacity of the actor to act by himself, and become an actor. Rosenau argues the improved 
intellectual and social capacity of individuals is a major reason why they entered the 
international system. One may see this fact as a consequence of the possibility of using 
modern communications, though. This does not invalidate Rosenau’s assumption, although it 
opens space for the model created by Isenberg. The emergence of a better-prepared ecosystem 
enhances the chances individuals will become entrepreneurs, or, in our case, act within the 
international system. The second is the micro-macro relation. Within an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, organizations may acknowledge the emergence of individual actors and act within 
macro structures in order to enhance the quality, quantity and success rate of individual 
action. The same can be made with the international system. Rosenau acknowledges this, as 
he understands that in case state centric institutions recognize the emergence of individuals, 
they may be more capable of taking advantage of their action, besides being able to work in 
order to improve it by improving the ecosystem itself. 
On diplomacy, we may get back to Badie, as he states individuals are channels of 
diplomacy within their single actions of interacting with the world. One can predict, then, that 
an individual friendly ecosystem can boost the action of those extra-official diplomats. The 
model, at first, explains how an individual gets to action. He is made aware of the 
possibilities; he interacts with other individuals globally, gets mentored by better educational 
institutions and is triggered by international phenomena the same ecosystem makes him think 




doors for understanding that shaping this ecosystem can both boost and restrain individual 
action on the international arena. One might keep in mind that once individuals are made 
aware of possibilities, and tools are given to them, the chain of events that boosts individual 
participation within international phenomena can hardly be stopped, as proven by viral videos 
and movements like Kony 2012.  
Applying this same model to Foreign Policy, there are two possible insights. The first 
insight is to consider is the possibility of participation of individuals on national building of 
foreign policy. Again, the same rules proposed on diplomacy are valid. The more developed 
the ecosystem is, the more individual action may apply on it. National discussion, however, 
implies a bigger assessment on the capacity of individuals to take part on political decisions. 
Although I have said foreign policy needs to take on sociological research before becoming a 
decision, and have also stated the importance of every related actor within the policy 
construction, it is possible that the individual participation restricts to the sphere of public 
opinion. In such a case, the ecosystem serves more as a trigger for collective action than a tool 
for individual entrepreneurship. One possibility does not preclude the other, though, and 
individuals may take part on foreign policy decision-making whenever they are granted the 
tools and made aware of their own capability, as they feel prepared for it. The second insight 
lies in the execution of foreign policy within the international arena. Nevertheless the state is 
to be the main voice on the decided foreign policy (which may have already been influenced 
by individuals and by a balanced decision-making theory), the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
opens space for other individuals and institutions to act wherever they feel (and are 
empowered to by the same ecosystem) they are needed or they can be of help or influence. 
Although the ecosystem does not add to the relevance of actors in the international arena, it 
does help to explain how this micro-macro interaction can take place. 
If we take war, security and global issues tackling as the paradigm, though, the 
ecosystem takes a different shape. On one hand, as security (and by security I mean a broad 
synthesis, which encloses food security, resources security, privacy, terrorism and other 
security issues) issues are often taken secretly or handled with more proximity by 
governments, there is very few stimuli to the development of the ecosystem. On global issues, 
as well, the same problem applies. As governments feel responsible for dealing with them, 
even modern communications are not enough stimuli to massive action by individuals. This 
does not preclude every kind of action from the private/individual world, though. It does 
make it harder, and most people have a very hard time broadcasting the need of action on 




Amnesty are living proof that some entrepreneurs gather and try to act. Those NGOs play a 
very important role, and some have become very big and international. They do not, though, 
possess enough power to tackle global issues or to make international participation within 
security a standard, though. In this sense, there is no accurate analysis one can draw, although 
the ascension of some of them has helped increase the awareness on some issues, and thus, 
developed the ecosystem and boosted the creation of other NGOs, like what happened with 
Greenpeace, which became a giant. 
If you apply the model to borders, we have an interesting explanation for individual 
action throughout international expansion of corporations, the ascendance of born-global 
enterprises, immigration and knowledge sharing through student exchanges. Business 
accelerators, student exchange facilitators and other institutions, boost all of those. This helps 
understanding how the entrepreneurship ecosystem works. Also, it helps understand how 
individuals can create relationship with other individuals abroad, and develop, as Kenichi 
says, greater empathy for foreigners that share the same culture or religion, for example, than 
for nationals that share the same flag. Religious movements may as well become more 
rational, if we take their morals and needs of expansion as triggers of the ecosystem, which 
empowers individuals to be fearless of outcomes and to act even if there are difficulties as 
language barriers, visa costs of cultural diversity. Sometimes, the very existence of borders 
can serve as enough a stimulus for an individual to undertake international action. 
 The entrepreneurial ecosystem has, thus, the exact opposite role of the Science of 
Complexity, as it seeks to explain the path through which individuals become actors on the 
international world. The Complex System approach, on the other hand, aims to understand 
what the outcomes of individuals actions are, despite the way they become international 
actors. 
The last theoretical model I may present, in order to provide enough tools for a better 
understanding of the globalized world we live in, is a very simple model created by Stanley 
Hoffman. Although it is a very simple model, Hoffman’s model is important to facilitate the 
understanding of the world, as it comes from and counters two ideas that come from 
mainstream theory, which are the three-dimensional chess game and the zero-sum game 
theory. The first comes from neoliberal theorist Joseph Nye. The second is a premise for 
classical realist approaches.  
In Oxford, by 2010, Nye described his idea of the world’s power distribution as being 
a big three-dimensional chess game. On the top board, there is the military power among 




decades. China’s not going to replace the US on this military board. The middle board of this 
three dimensional chess game is economic power among states. Power is multipolar. There 
are balancers, like the US, Europe, China, Japan, they can balance each other. The bottom 
board of the three-dimensional chess game, the board of transnational relations, things that 
cross borders outside the control of governments, things like climate change, drug trade, 
financial flows, pandemics, all the things that cross borders outside the control of 
governments. There is nobody I charge. It makes no sense to call this unipolar or multipolar. 
Power is chaotically distributed. Although Nye’s description is very lucid, I believe Kenichi, 
Rosenau and Badie’s ideas would go strongly against it. For many reasons, starting from 
assuming a state centric conformation of international relations, to putting the economical and 
financial flows as a subject of security and war, to considering economic relations to be 
multipolar, and, thus, state centric, to denying the importance of micro-macro relations within 
international relations, and so on. 
The zero-sum game theory is the idea that any dispute within states, power or 
economics, has negative outcomes for the losers. In this sense, if one wins, the other loses, as 
the sum of the outcomes must be zero. This model is too simple to explain the reality, as most 
of the interactions in the globalized world are positive sum games. Kenichi describes very 
well how corporations can add value to the administration of cities or states, for instance, and 
this is only a small slice. If you analyze through Badie’s theory, even a single person can be 
benefited from interactions with other persons around the world, and benefit as well those 
other people, making from interactions positive sum games. 
Deriving from the neoliberal model of Nye, than, and countering the zero-sum game 
theory, Hoffman describes the world as a multiple chess game. Not a three or four 
dimensional, but maybe a million dimensional chess game, each one with different rules, 
players and objectives. This way it is possible to explain multiple interactions of several 
actors within the international system, and even comply with Isenberg, Santos, Allison and 
Glattfelder’s theory. Throughout Hoffman’s model, though, it’s easy to infer the interactions 
represented by the chess games are always competitions. I may propose some tuning on this 
fact, though, as I believe not all interactions are competitions, but several of them are 
cooperation, negotiation, benchmarking, and philanthropy and etc. The fewer chess pieces 
each player loses, the better. It matters very little who checkmates. The fewer lost pieces, the 
more the interaction configures itself as cooperation, instead of battle. This way it is easier to 
see the world as a big market, full of possibilities for infinite agents. This way it is easier to 




described in the metaphor. They act differently and achieve different outcomes; after all, not 
all of the chess players are good players.  
Taking diplomacy, what kind of innovation or insight appears as a possibility after the 
new model is applied? The first thing is that the extra official diplomats, described by Badie, 
the individuals, are found an arena to act. This means more than understanding they have 
impact on global decisions and communication, but providing a theoretical model for 
analyzing how this diplomacy goes on. Diplomacy goes from a single board with 200 players 
to thousands of boards each with an unpredictable number of players. Does this derail 
analysis capability on diplomacy? No. The main change is that phenomena not yet 
considered, or actors still not accounted for becoming part of the equation, and, then, the 
probable outcome is that analytical efforts may become more comprehensive and, thus, more 
lucid. If you consider the other theories I presented beforehand, the conclusion is that, instead 
of becoming harder or less detailed/analytic, studies will become different. Other variables 
will be at stake; other kinds of theoretical conclusions and other roles shall be discovered. 
Papers shall come in format of complex system or ecosystem analysis, instead of discussions 
on decisions from single representatives. An important point is that considering the multiple 
chess game, new drawn boards can be analyzed with the same detail the three-dimensional 
chess game is to be analyzed today. There is much work to do, then.  
Moving to Foreign Policy, a globalization-friendly macro understanding of decision-
making process is made possible as the multiple chess game is drawn. This is due to the 
overview that the model creates. If one understands a political process as part of many 
discussions and to be the outcome of it, besides the microanalysis provided by Santos’ work, 
there is space for inputting new variables, derived from globalization, into the process that is 
already mapped. More than that, when it comes to the international arena, it becomes easier to 
link different discussions, issues and outcomes, as all of them are comprised of different chess 
games, and as outcomes and discussions are expected to influence other outcomes and 
discussions, interconnectedness becomes visible, although complex. One of the important 
assets that is created, thus, is that as several chess games are considered, the micro-macro 
relation that forms international phenomena can finally be assessed, as the model recognizes 
both as parts of the outcome. Besides the approach under Rosenau’s micro-macro relation 
importance theory, though, as the zero-sum games are considered not to be the standard of all 
relations within international relations, foreign policy may admit collaboration in a deeper 
level, as different actors (governmental or not) can gather to work together and/or compete 




games. Political analysis, besides becoming a matter of understanding the involved variables, 
structures, possible outcomes and interests, and mixing all up together, becomes multiple, as 
various political process can go on at the same time. 
Bringing the discussion to war, security and global issues, the first thing to assess is 
the three-dimensional chess game drawn by Nye. In that model, military and war subjects had 
a bigger importance, and, therefore, would be represented by a first level of the chess game, 
which did not have space for different actors like the non-governmental actors the globalized 
world empowers to become international agents. In this sense, and having presented my 
opinion on how governments should take responsibility on action regarding security issues, 
what would the usage of a multiple chess game model? The usage of such model comes to 
stake as we understand that although governmental actors shall take responsibility for 
execution, they are not alone on planning and preparing whatever actions and policies are to 
become the countries’ security strategy. Corporations are to be involved on the manufacturing 
processes, consulting firms in the strategy making, single actors on the training of preparing 
of armies, and all of this, as we are not considering other security threats. If we consider 
disease conducted security threats, water management or food security issues to be on stake, a 
much bigger range of non-governmental actors comes to action, and their incomes have to be 
understood under the frame of a multiple chess game model. Said that, we have implicitly 
accepted two assumptions: the first is that there are some chess games that are more important 
than others. This is true, and beyond, the importance of the chess game depends not only on 
the subject it is about, but also on the individual actors (or the systemic impact of that group 
of actors) within the international system. A second assumption is that security actions may 
be dealt with by leaving the multiple chessboard frameworks. This does not mean, though, 
that political decisions on security subjects is dealt with outside of the model, although one 
shall accept that the relative power of governments within the international system is not to be 
neglected and, as expected, may take control over action, as expected from them. At this 
point, I may, again, state that the globalized world has to be considered under new theories. 
Nevertheless, these new theories do not necessarily take the state out of the commanding 
position on some subjects, although the entrance of new actors is important and may change 
the balance, outcomes or analysis over the international system. 
On global issues, the outcome is not different. The new insight is that offering 
different actors the chance to discuss and act within the multiple chess board game opens 
doors for the achievement of solutions outside the jurisdiction or without help from the state. 




sense, solutions for global issues can come from cities, individuals, states, policy, discussion 
on international organizations or any other instance the new globalized world considers, as we 
open the theoretical approach for the multiple chessboard model. 
Borders related discussion, once the multiple chessboard frameworks are applied, also 
acquires new possibilities. The most significant of, nonetheless, is that non-nationals can be 
part of the chess game related to national quarrels, and this opens space for a whole new range 
of international phenomena. As people become aware of their capability to ignore borders, 
national concerns at some points may become international as public opinion tackles them, 
and the chessboard game model helps understand that. Mostly in cases of human rights issues, 
as we know by now, or climate change related discussions, individuals and their own opinions 
have acquired the power to gather together and discuss. Their influence capacity derives both 
from individual capacity encompassed by each member (everything changes if Bill Gates, for 
example, is part of a group), but also from the strength of the group, in the so-called feature of 
emergence. The edge between national issues and international phenomena becomes fluid, 
then, and a new set of action from related actors becomes urgent. As they need to concern 
with actors that were not planned to be part of the discussion. The logical consequence is an 
empowerment of public opinion as an influence on both national and international politics, 
economics and societies.  
Having presented four different analytical tools that should be used to provide a 
keener understanding of the possibilities of the globalized world, and, more than that, that can 
be used to understand the real role and needed reform on the institutions we live by, a 
challenge poses. How does the world look like with the different analytical tools all applied? 
What are the differences between this current world and past ones? Why does this new 
analysis understand a globalized world better, for institutions? 
Having taken into account the three main sources’ ideas and theories, the first 
conclusion is that theory is not enough prepared to deal with the new world order brought by 
the globalized world. This would be a stupid conclusion, though. At first, the ideas of Kenichi 
and Rosenau, the triggering ideas for this article, are 20 years old. It’s not that the world 
changed enough to make them outdated, on the contrary, they were triggers for much more 
theoretical development and during these 20 years the available theoretical pool increased 
exponentially, in order to cover the new possibilities driven by the globalized world. New 
technological development, however, as happened in the 1990’s, has created much more 
possibilities and raised the interaction possibilities even more. Content analysis, big data, 




are today’s trending topics, as they shape the role of representatives, the power of policies and 
the value of individuals, and theory is on its way to adapt. Theory will always be one step 
behind the world, and, thus, this is not something to concern.  
Nevertheless, the institutions that act in order to keep governance of the world, as said 
before, have been created with enough tools and roles to act in a world that had not been 
explained yet. In order words, they have been planned to deal with problems and actors that 
no longer are the main actors of the international system. They are based on an outdated 
theory and, thus, cannot be expected to be able deal with a world they were not created to deal 
with. The structure whereby they are used, though, expects that. International organizations 
and the roll of institutions that govern the world, the nations and people’s lives are expected 
to come up with solutions and govern the world. They try that. Institutional Innovation is a 
constant within those institutions’ chambers, but even this innovation is conditioned to the 
structure they are comprised within and, thus, is not going to be enough innovation to make 
them become properly prepared.  
This is the reason why I chose two old critic ideas to cope with. I believe the 
institutions of our globalized world still need to learn the lessons the other sectors of the 
world learned from these authors. In order to prove my point, then, I chose Badie’s work. 
Badie criticizes one of the paradigms I put into stake in a very incendiary way, using ideas 
very close to those presented by Rosenau and Kenichi. In this sense, the very existence of 
Badie’s critics is a proof of the righteousness of my hypothesis, somehow.  
In this sense, as one accepts the condition of the world institutions and complies with 
the hypothesis I gave, very few solutions arise. Those institutions are part of an international 
structure that is not likely to change (Nye, 2010).  The roles of representatives, the theory that 
continues to be generated to explain and help them thrive throughout history, the expected 
outcomes and solutions, they will remain for a long time, they are part of how today’s world 
organizes, and even part of the ecosystem I drew before to explain how individuals may get 
into action. There are two paths, then.  
The first is to try to figure out a way to change the very core of those institutions, in 
order to make them compliant with the world they lie in. The first comment is that a political 
effort like this would probably take years of discussion and adaptation to happen, even 
considering the participants of each of the institutions were willing to do so. It is much more 
complex than just opening doors for actors other than states.  Decision-making procedures, 
signed treaties and international operations, for example, would all have to be completely 




structure, if one dares to create it. How come anybody expect, i.e., 7 billion people to be part 
of a decision process? It is not feasible.  
The second option, which I like more, requires one to think of, firstly, the two worlds 
described by Rosenau. The first insight is that the two worlds need to recognize the existence 
and importance of the other. The next one is that they both influence each other. In this sense, 
winding up, what we have is, at the first world, a structure comprised of all of the actors of the 
globalized order, but in which states are the representatives, and in the second world, the same 
actors, but state bureaucracies serving as part of the equation to understand international 
relations, instead of ruling it. This is what Rosenau drew 20 years ago, though. In that sense, 
and as Rosenau poses a question mark on what this scenario would build up to become, I 
believe Badie has got a good answer for it. Empowered individuals have already started 
taking places and influencing on these institutions. This is as true as the institutional 
innovation going on in many of them. Institutions try to adapt, as adaptation seems 
mandatory, and it seems mandatory as individuals gather importance and start influencing 
them, to a point in which there has to be organized work into it. In this sense, a mix between 
the two worlds, where they coexist and fight, cooperate and thrive to understand each other, 
can answer Rosenau’s question mark, thus. Development within this very situation is 
expected to continue, and, then, the analytical tools I provided may be important both for 
institutions and other instances of the international system to better explain how phenomena 
happen.  The main difference, then, between an analysis made before the acknowledgement of 
individuals as actors within international relations, and one made after it, regarding 
institutions, is the weight of institutions within global governance. As they become a part of 
the international action that goes on, they are derailed from their role to be governance, to 
become part of it, and, thus, are demanded to learn how to take action, and be effective. They 
are demanded, though, to use different tools for analysis. 
In this sense, an important asset of institutions is the capacity of understanding the 
world, besides their own operational procedures, an effort that requires the involved 
participants to acknowledge the emergent importance of different actors, and that has the 
power to improve their effectiveness. That taken into account, my idea is that, understanding 
structures is not likely to change, one needs obsolete institutional tools to adapt through 
acknowledgment of the new features of the world. In this sense, an international institution, in 
the contemporary world, is demanded to understand the details behind the speech of each of 
the representatives. It is demanded to know the consequences their actions can trigger, and to 




It is not a big political change, practically speaking, although it is a very important adaptation 
that can be the final edge between a failed institution and an operational and useful one.  
If that is right, the expectable change within institutions is to be seen on their analyses 
of the world, its problems and possible solutions (and, thus, the political action they may 
urge). Institutions would start understanding the world through the usage of tools like the ones 
I presented, for instance. This means economical assessments from WTO should include 
Complex System analyzes, as well as Climate Change problems descriptions should include 
the Ecosystems of organizations and individual empowerment tools that can urge individuals, 
cities, other institutions and governments to act. Treaties should consider the opinions and 
influence held by non-state actors, instead of only letting they operate behind the stage, as 
well as a more efficient usage of interactions made possible my multiple chessboards game 
framework becomes a possibility. Different institutions would be able to relate to other 
institutions, and interact with individuals and feed from their opinions and knowledge, as well 
as policies can be better planned to achieve more as the understanding of the Complex 
Systems in the world grows.  
There are, for sure, limits on the tools I provided. They were not, however, supposed 
to address every kind of international issue, especially after presenting a world in which the 
possibility of interaction achieves a point in which theory cannot follow anymore. They are 
supposed, though, to give a better understanding of what kind of path one should follow in 















A few methodological concerns 
 
In order to capture the process used to create the research and to make sure any other 
international analyst can assess my conclusions and test my hypothesis, I will make some 
comments on the used methodology. 
The first thing to know about this article is that the basic methodology used to 
organize the problem and understand it was process tracing. I chose it because process tracing 
involves the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to 
supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses. The central concern, then, is 
with sequences and mechanisms in the unfolding of hypothesized causal processes. I looked 
for observable implications of the hypothesized explanation, often examining evidence at a 
finer level of detail or a lower level of analysis than that initially posited in the relevant 
theory. The goal was to establish whether the events or processes within the case fit those 
predicted by alternative explanations. Process tracing was able to provide inferential leverage 
on the problem, as it helped discover the connections between each phase of the macro 
process I analyzed. 
Process tracing showed itself, thus, as the perfect methodological tool to help describe 
the problem I drew and hypothesize within it. There are two reasons why it fit so well. The 
first is that once it allowed descriptive inference into the research question, hypothesizing 
became possible. As the variables and described phenomena stand in the theoretical world, 
there was a need for causal inference, and process tracing would accept it. The second is the 
existence of non-quantitative hypothesis testing tools, which I was able to use to test the 
hypothesis. This case I used hoop tests and smoking gun tests, which, together, ensure the 
validity of the hypothesis. A hoop test is a test that eliminates the hypothesis in case it fails it, 
although passing on it does not confirm whether it is true or not. A smoking gun test, on the 
contrary, does not eliminate a hypothesis if it fails, however, if it passes it, it is confirmed to 




Rosenau and Badie’s theories and insights provided the empirical evidence I needed to 
conclude the tests both through their theories and through their conclusions. I drew, then, 




The first map (figure 1) is a simple photograph of the world as it is now, as I see it. 
Using empirical data from the three mentioned sources, I created a chronological process-
tracing map to be described as follows. Starting from Rosenau’s work, I describe a world in 
which International Relations Theory, which I will call the Old IR Theory, is depicted and 
used by people to understand the world they live in (their Worldviews), to understand 
International Relations Phenomena (IR Phenomena) and the recognize the actors involved (IR 
Actors). This Old IR Theory serves as the base for the planning and creation of the 
institutions related to the international system. As Rosenau sees it, though, globalization 
related processes and, especially the development of new technology within information 
sciences and communication, changes the way Worldviews, the IR Phenomena and the IR 
Actors act within the world, creating a new Reality, which derives from the changes 
Globalization triggered. The biggest change, though, is the new autonomy of other actors over 
state centric related institutions. On Rosenau’s thoughts, though, there had not been enough 
development of new theories to address this world. Kenichi supports this conclusion from 










Old IR Theory 




Rosenau and, more than that, states these changes and the reality recreated by the changed 
variables (Worldviews, IR Phenomena and IR Actors), do shape the world despite of States or 
state centric based institutions. They both are in a 20-year-old world, though. When we put 
this scenario in the contemporary world, what we see is a clear development of a New IR 
Theory, which should be able to tackle the absence Rosenau found, but that, according to 
Badie, still cannot reach (or has very limited influence over) the Institutions created by the 




The second map (figure 2) is a deep dive into the problem I found. If one looks at the 
first map, questions may arise whether there is or not a problem within the fact that 
Institutions are influenced by state centric views. A first glimpse would attach this feature to 
the need of streamlining processes of decision-making and, thus, no problem would exist. 
Therefore, the second map is important. It is also a deeper analysis on Badie and Kenichi’s 
work. The first description it encompasses is the update of Worldviews, IR Phenomena 
understanding and the recognizing of IR Actors through Globalization. They all acquire new 
significance, reach and potential as Globalization entails its new paradigms. They do shape 
what people and entities think of the world, how they act upon it and how they assess the 
phenomena in the international arena. According to Kenichi and Badie, this is a reality. Badie, 
Process Tracing (the problem!) 
New IR Theory 




















nonetheless, also describes how outdated institutions18, as they are expected to provide global 
governance, restrict the reach of those updated variables, as they both do not understand the 
new variables and they try to treat them with a state centric modus operandi and preclude the 
fulfillment of their potential as they lack tools to help, act and support properly. New IR 
Theory, though, and Badie supports this view, has limited influence over those institutions. 
This is proved once one acknowledges their efforts to provide institutional innovation. The 
New IR Theory, yet, as it provides a New Approach for Institutions (whether this approach 
reaches institutions or not), amends Worldviews, IR Phenomena understanding and the 
recognizing of IR Actors, as those variables seize new possibilities and increase in size, 




The third map (figure 3) represents my approach on what can be done to improve 
institutions’ awareness and actions towards the globalized world. As stated before, there is 
very few chance institutions can be changed to their core as to improve their procedures and 
understanding of the new paradigms of the globalized world. In this sense, I mentioned four 
analytical tools that can help improve this awareness, despite the state centric basis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Created	  by	  Old	  IR	  Theory	  and	  very	  few	  influenced	  by	  New	  Approaches	  derived	  from	  
New	  IR	  Theory	  
































institutions hold. Said that, the map describes how, according to the aforementioned analyses, 
Globalization impacts people’s Worldviews19, the IR Phenomena20 and IR Actors21. Having 
impacted the Old IR Theory, a new, Globalization compliant IR Theory is developed. This 
theory provides, besides new concepts of Institutions, new analytical tools 22 . As we 
understand we can’t change Institutions to their very core, it is feasible to use those new 
analytical tools to provide both information and plan action for them. In this sense, they can 
be adapted to the globalized world as those analytical tools are capable of doing so. 
Having gone through this three-way path at analyzing the problem, I was able to 
create a hypothesis to address the research question23. According to the Process Tracing 
technique, the best way to test this hypothesis, having evidence handy, is to pass it through 
Hoop and Smoking Gun tests. I developed, then, one series of tests of each kind for testing 
the hypothesis. 
The two developed Hoop Tests are: 
 
Hoop Tests 
 Clue Inference Result 
1 
Decision Procedures did not 
change. There has been no 
major revolution, out of 
technology development 
Also, people’s responses to 
technology development is 
alike and repetitive. 
As Political events are not 
subtle (historically, one 
might say history is pretty 
much streamline and thus 
theory and institutions have 
had time to update, which 
demonstrates they are 
outdated. 
PASS 
2 Treaties do not consider the 
needed details for global 
The considered variables on 
state centric reviews are not 
PASS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  As	  it	  opens	  people’s	  minds	  to	  their	  potential	  of	  interaction,	  and	  for	  the	  capacity	  they	  
have	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  in	  all	  instances.	  
20	  As	  new	  phenomena	  may	  emerge,	  and	  they	  may	  not	  always	  include	  the	  participation	  of	  
States.	  
21	  This	  happens	  as	  individuals	  and	  other	  micro	  actors	  are	  recognized	  as	  participants	  of	  
the	  international	  system.	  
22	  Complex	  Systems	  Analysis,	  Multiple	  Chessboard	  games	  frameworks,	  balanced	  rational	  
decision-­‐making	  model	  and	  the	  entrepreneurial	  ecosystem	  are	  the	  ones	  I	  chose.	  
23	  Research	  Question:	  Why	  did	  the	  world	  contemporary	  phenomena	  become	  so	  hard	  to	  




issues tackling, and often 
require further studies after 
signings. 
the main variables of world 
problems anymore. 
 
The two developed Smoking Gun Tests are: 
 
Smoking Gun Tests 
 Clue Inference Result 
1 
Available evidence on 
micro/macro agents taking 
advantage on the globalized 
world’s features 
As people understand the 
logic of the world apart 
from theory and take 
advantage on it, the world is 
not harder to understand nor 
is theory adapted to it 
PASS 
2 
New Global Issues are 
directly related to 
individuals, and not always 
require States to intervene. 
International Phenomena 
have gone beyond macro 
relations to be part of micro 




In a theoretical scheme, thus, the hypothesis seems right. As I affirm the derived 
paradigms are outdated, though, there is a need for a more profound analysis on them, in 
order to prove their compliance to the hypothesis and, thus understand its relation with the 
world and validity for empirical implementation. To accomplish this, rather than again stating 
their condition, I may try to discover what the main reasons for this condition are. In this 
sense, I may analyze the paradigms of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War & Global Issues and 
Borders in order to discover whether they relate to the hypothesis and prove themselves 
outdated or not. On the same assessment, I will try to figure out what the main cause for the 
condition is. For this to happen I created a causal diagram in which some variables will be 
assessed and then, having the results from all four paradigms, I will apply Przeworski’s 
method in order to make up conclusions. 
The first task, then, is to define which variables will serve the objective of testing the 




they are or not updated24 regarding the globalized world, the dependent variable will be the 
Need for Update. In this case, a Yes would mean the paradigm’s condition is harmful, 
incoherent or insufficiently developed to tackle and/or deal with the world as it is expected to. 
A No, on the other hand, means there is no need for any changing and the paradigm is already 
able to address all aspects of a globalized world. 
There will be, as well, an Intervenient Independent Variable, to serve as a bridge or 
confirmation for the Dependent Variable’s assessment, from the Principal Interdependent 
ones. Its role is to assess whether the input generated by the Independent Principal Variables 
really impacts the Dependent Variable, and, thus, it will be the Impact of New Actors in 
Decisions, put there to assess whether the Existence of New Actors as an Independent 
Principal Variable really accounts for the necessity of update. It’s an important assessment as 
the entrance of new actors in the international arena or within a specific institution or 
paradigm may not grant them importance or provide them decision-making power. In this 
sense, this power is to be proven by a simple assessment on the generated interaction 
potential, as explained by the tools presented in the last chapter. 
There will be three Independent Principal Variables. Their role is to provide the main 
evidence on the Need for Update assessment, and, thus, they will measure, firstly, the 
Existence of New Actors, as this is the first link proposed by Rosenau, theorizing on the 
micro-macro relation and its importance; existing Institutional Innovation experiences, as 
those experiences represent a last resource driven by institutions in order to adapt, and thus, 
reveal a Need for Update, and the Importance of States for the Decision, as some Global 
Issues and matters in the contemporary globalized world do not involve States anymore, this 
variable can be used as a measure for a better understanding on what is expected from 
institutions and who comprises them, and, then, their need for reform. 
At last, there will be an Independent Antecedent Variable, which is a historical 
concept that, in this case, will be our control to whether the diagnosed problem really exists 
on those paradigms or not. This will be the State Centric Base, which can be inferred by the 
kind of participant that should take place on a classical understanding of the paradigm, for 
example. 
The explained process is summarized in figure 4, below: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Assessing	  whether	  they	  preclude	  world’s	  development	  would	  require	  a	  much	  bigger	  
quantitative	  work	  into	  comparing	  GDPs,	  HDIs,	  GDPs	  per	  capita	  and	  so	  on.	  On	  this	  sense,	  I	  






Therefore, the first paradigm to be analyzed is Diplomacy. Diplomacy has a strong 
State Centric base, as it was created to serve as (and firstly conceptualized as) an interstate 
tool for negotiation and communication (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011). In this sense, 
the State Centric Base is confirmed. As Badie explains, indeed, Diplomacy is not anymore 
composed of only national actors, as individuals and organizations take part on it, even if they 
do not know or acknowledge that. This way, the Existence of New Actors is also confirmed. 
The impact of those actors on the diplomatic instances is to be questioned, though (Badie, 
2008). It is true that some of their actions pose no difference into the state centric sphere. 
However, as some do, and the globalization trends boost them to become more and more 
important, this impact is to be considered both existent and important. On the Institutional 
Innovation side, both institutions that derive from diplomatic efforts have adapted to hear the 
opinions of individuals25 and diplomacy formulation institutions have changed to accept 
inputs from outside their own walls26. Considering that, Institutional Innovation is also to be 
considered positive. The importance of Nation States for Decisions, within Diplomacy, is 
very big. However, as trends show an ascendant path for individuals, representing the trends 
is yet more important than taking a picture, as the picture is likely to change (Badie, 2008). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Put	  an	  example	  here	  
26	  Either	  reference	  or	  put	  an	  example	  
































Even considering the State answers for most diplomatic instances for now, individuals and 
their possibilities are very likely to rise and be intense participants (Badie, 2008). A table to 






State Centric Base + 
Independent 
Principal Variables 
Existence of New Actors + 
Institutional Innovation + 




Impact of New Actors in 
Decisions 
+ 
Dependent Variable Need for Update + 
 
After Diplomacy, we shall analyze Foreign Policy. Considering Foreign Policy to be 
the external reflection of a State’s interest, the State Centric Base of this paradigm is certain. 
As we explore international institutions where Foreign Policy is addressed and shown, it is 
concrete that States, as both participants and spokesmen of national interests represent 
themselves this State Centric Base.  
As we move towards the Existence of New Actors, the discussion needs to split. On 




new actors is proven. As Foreign Affairs ministries and representatives are obliged to make a 
sociological analysis of their decisions at every point of the Foreign Policy building 
procedure, it is a fact. On the international side, as well, as decisions and negotiation rounds 
are formulated to address problems regarding individualized issues27, the existence of new 
actors within foreign policy analysis is proven. The analysis on their impact over foreign 
analysis, as well, is not a hard one. Although one might raise arguments over their position 
out of the rooms of discussion, one may not deny the influence the micro scenario has over 
the international organizations. Raising examples as big corporations, celebrities, the pope, 
Steve Jobs and other individuals of renown is just a few of the evidence one can provide. 
Kenichi would probably agree on this point. As it comes to institutional innovation, again, the 
split will be useful. Especially because the answer on the existence of institutional innovation 
differs whether we are talking on the national or the international side. In the national side, 
many countries have implemented participation and contribution mechanisms for their 
citizens to take part on foreign policy formulation. As we understand the political process to 
include many quarrels and several individuals, this thought cannot but increase and prove 
itself right, even if official policies regarding this are not approved.  If one takes the 
international side, though, the discussion changes a lot. It is hard to find adaptation 
movements within international chambers of discussion, as most of the procedures and 
traditions are decided already. There is little space for innovation, as representatives and 
participants will not likely change themselves alone. In this sense, one shall not consider 
institutional innovation to be a trend within decision offices in the international system. The 
importance of the State for decisions regarding Foreign Policy, though, should go in the 
contrary way. There is no way one can acknowledge the micro scenario to be more important 
the States within Foreign Policy analysis. However, the trend is to have more and more 
international issues being tamed and treated by micro actors alone, without the participation 
of States. Nonetheless, can we account these as representations of a Nation’s foreign policy? 
The easier answer is no. In this sense, there is a Need for Update within Foreign Policy, as 
national movements and their importance in the international systems need to be accounted 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  WTO	  negotiation	  rounds,	  for	  instance,	  are	  driven	  at	  solving	  individual	  related	  issues,	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Impact of New Actors in 
Decisions 
+ 
Dependent Variable Need for Update + 
 
As we change for an analysis on War and Security, as for Global Issues Tackling, 
discussion acquires a more complex tone. This happens, as those are paradigms that hold an 
important feature within them, which is danger. Danger for what other individuals, nations, 
actors or even nature may do. Beyond, it’s a realm covered by unpredictability, as decisions 
or outcomes may shape other decisions and outcomes, but not always in a streamlined way. 
From this comes insecurity. Insecurity causes nations to hold those issues to them, to create 
safety protocols and to care about information, to deal with priorities and to invest in 
whatever can make them feel safe. Defying the view of nation states as organisms, though, 
and, thus, defying classical views of security problems, globalization both increases the risks 
of several activities and spreads the concept of security, as it creates different issues that need 




scenario related actors, to the stage, which causes the security related activities to be much 
more expensive, for example28. In this sense, both the State Centric Base and the existence of 
new actors make sense on an analysis of War and Security. The impact of those actors is also 
very important. Although their participation possibilities have not risen as much as in other 
international spheres, as Diplomacy, for instance, their potential to become sole risks or to 
interfere on security and global issues apart from states increased exponentially, as the micro 
scenario gets empowered by technology development and other features of a globalized 
world. In this sense, for a relatively big slice of the issues concerning countries nowadays, it 
is true to say that there are solutions that do not rely solely on State related action. In this 
sense, one is challenged to assess the last variable, institutional innovation. One of the biggest 
challenges regarding global issues is global governance tools incapacity to deal with them 
properly. In this sense, and considering threat in an expanded way, there has been very little 
institutional innovation due to restrictions on global governance institutions’ will and 
openness. Said that, there is a need for update within war, security and global issues tackling 
activities, as they change and increase due to globalization, and thus need a new set of 
solutions and analytical tools to become globalized and address concerns of global interest in 
a global way. 
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Taking Borders under analysis, the first assessment is upon Borders creation. As the 
geopolitical lines that divide nations, Borders can be said to contain a State Centric Base. This 
is very easy to uncover as we assess, for example, the borders created by European colonizers 
in Africa in the XIX century. Taking an expanded concept of Borders, though, and opening 
space for post-globalization methods of crossing them, the existence of new actors and, as 
well, their big impact on decisions and matters relating borders is conveniently shown. If you 
think, for example, of the flows of capital over borders, the count of new actors, and beyond, 
the importance of them, their networks, relations and the way they interact is just one of the 
reasons why borders have adapted to well to globalization. On institutional innovation, there 
should be little complaining on accepting this paradigm has adapted well. Rising of 
immigration flows, international jobs as options, the press access to places, regional blocs 
with free transit, this is all institutional innovation taken by nations in order to adapt. Taking 
that into account, one variable that shows an unexpected behavior is the importance of States 
for decisions. Although we might say borders loosen each passed day, ideas like Parag 
Khanna’s still bring light to the theory that borders are significant on a governance point of 
view. Let me be clear. The organization of the world, divided by States, is useful for 
governance, development and many other instances. Apart from that, it is not likely to change 
in any way or at least any short term forecast. In this sense, one has to acknowledge the 
importance of State decisions to Borders discussions, as they are, at first, the most interested 




secondly, officially responsible for them. In this sense, the Need for Update is not required 
within the paradigm of Borders, as they are both viable and compliant with a globalized 
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Having described the four paradigms’ in an analytical way, there are some conclusions 
we can draw. Applying Przeworski’s “Most Similar Systems” Design, we can draw, for now, 
two important conclusions. The first comes from an analysis into the differences of the 
results. According to Przeworski, any set of variables that differentiates these systems in a 
manner corresponding to the observed differences of behavior can be considered as 
explaining these patterns of behavior. Taking the results as shown, and especially, the 




three chosen principal variables, as representatives of the impact of globalization, if observed, 
may lead to a need for upgrade in the paradigm. This means globalization strongly impacts 
old paradigms in a way they may need to adapt, whatever the impact is. The second 
conclusion is that globalization described as the emergence of individual actors, shown as the 
micro-macro relation within the international system, is a reality, as all of the four paradigms’ 
analyses prove it. As for it, one may also conclude that globalization impacts different 
paradigms of the old world in a different way, depending on the conditions in which they are 
conducted.  
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A case study on Brazil 
 
How to show, however, that an analysis as the proposed, over international related 
and international relations phenomena is feasible?  
Even after discussing how so many international matters are mistreated by state 
centric views, the first impression given on the usability of the new tools is that it will make 
political analysis harder. Not only for considering quantitative analysis to be a bigger part of 
international relations assessments (on the Complex Systems’ side), though. The existence of 
new actors within international relations and, thus, of new interactions, variables and roles, is 
to make any short assessment a shallow piece of work, isn’t it?  
My answer is that it is not. As stated before, the problem of state centric theory based 
policy, institutions or analysis is that it does not recognize the importance or existence of 
different actors of pieces of reality, not that it has not detailed their roles within international 
relations. In other words, in order to make the usage of those theories a feasible act, one does 
not need but to recognize their importance and measure their influence (or potential influence) 
on phenomena. It opens possibilities for much deeper analysis, of course. Psychology and 
sociology may become important trends over international relations studies, if we follow the 
trend. State level analysis, though, may not lose their importance, as long as they accept the 
other instances that affect them.  
This acceptance is important, not only to make analyses compliant with the world, but 
to prevent other episodes of obsoleteness and to let an open space for the creation of 
analytical tools and interdisciplinary development. Considering the needed changes triggered 
by globalization were mostly driven by technological development, there is no space for 
letting other episodes of obsoleteness happen, is technology is expected to reach further in the 
next decades. Cognitive computing, sustainable productivity, faster and cheaper 
transportation, distance learning, all of those trends can change, even more, the objects to 




poses challenges on understanding how these new trends affect the system and the people 
within it. For institutions, it cannot be different. On the second assumption, as new variables 
are put into stake, one might acknowledge the need for inputting, as well, other disciplines as 
both tools and base for explaining unpredicted kinds of interaction and action. 
One of the important conclusions globalization lets us come, for instance, is that 
Countries are much more than the governments they embed. As new actors, the micro actors, 
individuals and other organizations, enter the international system, governments, besides 
being able to control and judge all the actions, become part of the equations that help solve 
and understand phenomena. Sometimes more important, sometimes less, the important part of 
the idea is that they are parts, along with other parts, that may play a more strategic role on 
solving global issues, for example. How does this impact a government, though? What should 
be done? To answer both these questions, and the one proposed in the beginning of the 
chapter, I will to make a case study. More than only answering the questions, though, this 
case study comes handy now. As the necessary theory has been shown, the methodological 
and analytical tools proposed, and the problem stressed, the last challenge I want to pose is an 
example of a proper usage (or attempt) of the mechanisms I believe can help update obsolete 
institutions. Using Brazil’s case, I want to reaffirm the importance of such kind of analysis, 
focusing on the needed action for government actors and the different outcomes globalization 
has made a path for, considering innovation over the state centric derived institutions in the 
country. It is going to be my small contribution for the country’s development of a better 
understanding of the globalized world. 
To keep it short, I won’t but analyze three dilemmas within Brazilian contemporary 
international relations. The first is the transition of the state centric view to a law based 
public-private partnership. Although the model for infrastructure development exists in Brazil 
since the XIX century, when Pedro II built most of Brazilian railroads by providing subsidies 
on the Gold Tax, its emergence within Brazilian foreign affairs is relatively new. On this 
sense, the aimed universe of analysis is the range of government related international agencies 
and departments, lying into every Ministry and government institute, by now. It is true we can 
assess infrastructure development and Brazilian public biddings into this scope, as the largest 
partnerships involve multinational corporations, technology transfer and long-term 




international related agencies, though. Programs like “Ciência sem Fronteiras” and the recent 
call for security rising into government IT infrastructure29 serve as sources for this analysis.  
The first insight is that the micro actors of the micro sphere got into action on the 
Brazilian foreign affairs agenda. Part of the funding of the mentioned program, and also part 
of its organization come from private agents, in a sense that they help the government achieve 
its own objectives regarding this program. On the international side, the government, besides 
dealing with embassies and representatives, has visited universities to make deals 
individually, not in despise of nation states, but on some cases in spite of them. In this sense, 
an analysis following both the balanced rationale of politics theory and the multiple 
chessboard game model can bring some enlightenment old theories cannot. Government 
players had to involve several private agents to both take part on the discussion over the 
construction of the project and its execution, as multiple interests rose.  This sense, any zero-
sum based theory would raise concern over those decisions, and, based on this kind of theory, 
the program would probably never happen. Classical state centric theory would also probably 
identify the sharing of technology and know-how to be strategically negative, and, thus, an 
issue to security, which no participant has concluded by now. In this regard, only as we see a 
positive sum game played in many instances in which each decision depends on the influence 
each individual can show and apply, the program seems logic.  
If you take the presidential call as an example, as well, no state centric assessment 
would be able to detect the crescent rises in security flaws for the government, as both the 
risks were caused by individual actions and the solutions are concentrated in private-held 
knowledge. A systemic analysis on international flows of data and a serious consideration 
over the contents available in each of the involved servers could have raised this concern 
before, in the same way that an ecosystem analysis on the content sharing capacity of 
individuals could have created some concerns on security for IT before the problem had 
happened. Although one may arise a concern over the involvement of the US as the main 
agent, I may remember the private companies part of the scheme (as data holders), and the 
simple fact that the analysis went individually, over all kinds of data.  
One might notice I used the new tools to show how an analysis should be made to 
make sense of contemporary phenomena in the Brazilian international agenda. However, as 
they have happened anyway, what would the needed action be like, for the government? If 
you consider the laws that govern the private public relations I drew (government, companies, 






individuals, universities, agencies and so on), it is easy to notice how these laws still cannot 
acknowledge the participation and/or importance of the micro scenario over the macro one. In 
this sense, one might understand phenomena as the ones shown which are pioneers, and 
happened due to entrepreneurial action from individual representatives or private actors (even 
as the outcome of a long term procedure of influence usage and discussion). Having it adapted 
to new possibilities would raise the quantity of public private partnerships on the international 
level, to become more than a commercial relation, as public biddings are.  
The second dilemma is the entrance of society on the diplomatic headquarters of the 
ministry of foreign affairs, in a dispute that includes both international markets and regional 
integration. Clearly on the realm of Badie’s thoughts, but also in compliance with Gordon 
Brown’s lecture on the power of globalization to empower individuals, examples that can help 
us understand this second dilemma are the case of Brasileia, in Acre, regarding the Haitian 
and other refugees, and the case of Vale’s investment in Argentina. Brasileia can help 
understand how the importance of the Nation State can lower into international related 
phenomena, as the happening shows exactly how a city, having no support from the Union, 
decided by itself to provide passports and refugee condition documents to refugees coming 
from the border, who had been ignored by other countries. Now, this does not mean the State 
was completely absent, but at a first moment, the city dealt with it alone, and only because of 
the will of the Mayor (who would be emphasized by Benjamin Barber). A subnational actor in 
an urgent situation, as the city communicated with other countries representatives, executed 
diplomacy, in despise of borders and any other restrictions. After some urging, though, the 
State came to action as the city could not deal with the problem alone (for instance, there were 
hundreds of refugees coming in a daily basis and the city could not provide shelter or 
documents to everybody. The case of Argentina helps us understand how a private actor’s 
will can draw the trade and security treaties from a country to the other, as of Vale’s will give 
up on the enterprise to explore minerals in the province of Mendoza30, and that would mean a 
big loss for Argentinian economy, Brazilian representatives were called into action and 
Argentinian representatives would threaten closing doors to other existing investments, in 
order to make pressure for Vale to come back into the country. Both Brazilian and 
Argentinian foreign policy formulators had to negotiate with Vale and other private agents, 
and the trade policy for both countries depended much on Vale’s desires, considering that 
case. This is an example that can show how Brazilian diplomacy has been opening doors for 






the participation of other actors within it, and thus the same analytical tools used in the last 
dilemma could be applied here, with closely related outcomes, as we understand, for example, 
the trend within the ministry of foreign affairs to prioritize public opinion, the participation of 
NGO’s into debates and the commercial promotion of private companies into foreign trade 
chambers, which demonstrates, as well, institutional innovation.  
Into the third and last dilemma, besides understanding how both the shown paradigms 
are outdated in Brazil and how the new analytical tools can help understand the country’s 
international relations’ scenario, I want to pose how globalization, by not being well tackled 
and taken advantage of, has found barriers to develop itself into Brazil and into its social 
inequality environment. Although the country has grown the last few years, and the 
ascendance of a strong middle class is an important outcome of it, social inequality is yet a 
very big problem. In this sense, even considering the impressive impact of globalization in the 
country31, and how it has been developing to deal with it, as shown by the institutional 
innovation activities, the relative autonomy of new actors to impact and their importance in 
comparison with the State within international phenomena, the country’s social barriers still 
preclude a wide spread of globalization related opportunities into society. It poses a second 
problem, along with state centric derived obsolete institutions. What I mean is that as most 
Brazilians do not speak English nor have access to tools that can get them involved into 
international activities - which is the representation of a poor entrepreneurial ecosystem for 
international involvement of society - many individuals either connect to the world through 
indirect channels, such as national private companies that sell import services or poor media 
clipping releases that show biased information on world news, for example, or do not connect 
at all. In this sense, besides improving institutions to meet requirements posed by 
globalization and assessing opportunities based on new analytical tools, Brazilian authorities, 
as they take responsibility for connecting society to the international system, are to be faced 
by new boundaries, as they need to improve the necessary ecosystem, which includes, for 
instance, language teaching and intercultural experiences providing, in order to guarantee the 
success of government owned programs that rely on society to happen, for instance, Ciência 
Sem Fronteiras. There is a need for smart action instead of dull reaction. People are willing to 
seize opportunities and to adapt to whatever is shown, but as Brazil is a country that still relies 
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on XVI century industrialization through import substitution policies, internal barriers may 































To wind up the essay, the first task is to summarize the achieved results after the 
research-intensive work. On the theoretical side, thus, it is important to recognize the link 
between Rosenau and Kenichi’s work. Both are authors that pioneered on identifying the lack 
of compliance between the theory that was supposed to explain the world and the world itself. 
Badie’s work, thus, comes as a confirmation, not only of the condition of theory, but, more 
importantly, as theory has developed, on the condition of institutions, which have not adapted 
properly, even 20 years after the first diagnostic. In this sense, the core premises for a general 
assessment on institutions of global governance, according to these three authors, are that, 
first, that they derive from an old state centric theoretical base, second, they are demanded to 
deal with a globalized world they cannot understand, and, to some extent, destined to fail, 
third, the micro scenario actors already act upon the international system, in a way that action 
from institutions is needed and lastly, as other actors rise and new kinds of interaction among 
them are thought of, the relative importance of States for international matters decreases, in a 
decentralization trend.  
Taking these three authors as sources was important, not only to create a solid 
theoretical base for the essay, but to compose a comprehensive scenario, as they focus on 
different aspects of the international system. In this sense, political, economical, cultural and 
sociological matters are covered, to provide an analytical scope capable of taking an accurate 
picture of the contemporary world.  
Taking this into account, it seems logical that the world may look harder to understand 
or explain. The need for new analytical tools, as we understand the condition of international 
institutions and their assessment over the world, becomes apparent. To provide these tools, 
though, one interesting comment is that it was mandatory to look for interdisciplinary sources. 
A qualitative research with classical tools is not capable of providing an assessment as 




international scholars to have to partner with different schools of knowledge, as they may be 
required to make sociological analysis, pose systemic quantitative assessments or create 
ecosystems to predict action from individual actors. This serves as an answer, as well, to the 
arisen problem of the increased complexity to pose political assessments on the international 
system. The insight to be taken by the need of using new analytical tools is not that there will 
be a need for more analysis, but that the same pieces of reality we are used to assess will have 
to be understood differently, and consider the advent of new variables and actors. This way, 
what happens is not an increase in complexity, but in opportunity for analysis, as more slices 
of reality become part of the international system. 
It is important to point out that both the source theory and the provided analytical tools 
have limitations. One of the most important of them is that they carry a strong western bias 
within them. They are analysis over relations done in the white wealth west, and both eastern 
and emergent nations may have been misrepresented at some extent. The assessment over 
Brazilian relations (and the found similarities) and the discussion over the non-western 
authors aim at diminishing this problem. As those discussions have proved to be analogue to 
the considered western conclusions, and as most analyzed institutions are comprised within 
this same western theory, I believe this component will not be harmful to the content of the 
essay. 
Within theory, the last achieved result is the acknowledgement of specific flaws 
within the four chosen paradigms. Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War & Global Issues and 
Borders have proved to follow all of the theoretical assumptions derived from the source 
authors, and to be better explained by the provided analytical tools than by the old theory.  
At this point, the methodological approach over the same problems shows some 
important achievements, as well. The first to be pointed out is that there is compliance 
between the empirical and theoretical analyzes. As the chosen paradigms are effectively 
demanded to change, throughout the analysis of the involved variables, the logical 
conclusions driven by theory, and, thus, the hypothesis, were rightly chosen.  
The methodological analysis brought some insights on this subject. The first is that 
globalization, in any form, demands adaptation movement from institutions. Whether it is 
shown by a decrease in the relative power of the States, of an increase in the capacity of 
individuals to act and influence, or even the arousal of new problems that require institutional 
innovation, whenever it comes, paradigms are required to change. In this sense, the 
conclusion over Borders is very interesting, as Borders becomes a mid-term paradigm, which 




macro, State related matters (as it is an useful responsibility sharing tool). The changes 
Borders went through, though, are explicit as we look at Khanna’s ideas. 
An important point to be made within the methodological aspect is since it shows, 
throughout the hypothesis testing procedure; the importance of States remains high. This 
complies with Mazzucato’s theory on the risk taking capacity of States, and, though, 
discourages extremist theoretical development over the extinction of States (although, for 
instance, Benjamin Barber’s urge on the empowerment of cities, for example, is useful for an 
understanding on power shifts and institutional innovation options). It also opens space for 
new understanding on the role of States as part of the considered equations over the 
globalized world.  
Using the whole methodological process and new provided tools to analyze three 
dilemmas in Brazil proved also very interesting. On this point, it was very important to prove 
how Brazil had not been dealing well with the new opportunities that arise, but also on how 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem framework can help provide explanation for action, despite of 
State related support, for example. Brazil is far from being well adapted to the globalized 
world (which is already a reality and not anymore a far dream), although the nation is 
demanded to play the game with the big players and succeed as well. To improve the chances 
on taking better advantage and to improve people’s capacity to interact (providing, therefore, 
important bases for a well established public-private partnership), there is a need for 
adaptation, and thus, the needed tools for the beginning of the process have been provided. 
Considering the shown results, it is important to plan some scenarios of possible 
phenomena or trends within the international system. In this sense, I may draw four small 
assessments on what I believe are the next steps for globalization, considering the 
righteousness of the hypothesis and the need for update and adaptation within institutions of 
global governance. 
The first assessment is on theory. What changes on theory? The answer is easy, 
nothing. Theories come and go, and the different theories continue to provide different points 
of view that may be useful to explain different chunks of reality. Considering, though, that 
Globalization poses a structural change to the world, new trends of theoretical development 
may arise, regarding the changes led by new technological development, the importance of 
micro actors, new risks concerning empowerment of individuals and their capacities and so 
on. An important insight over this subject, though, is that the extent to which theories are 




One cannot afford, anymore, to provide state centric theoretical explanation on international 
affairs, anymore, as they are not limited to this level of analysis, as pointed by Rosenau.  
A second assessment is on the planned scenario for International Political Economy. 
As explained by Kenichi, the economical world is already mainly a concern of private and 
individual actors, and the borders over it are as fluid as the available capital and assets. In this 
sense, the need for update condition over institutions may increase their effectiveness and 
capacity to partner with such private institutions globally. The role of states on markets and 
economical chains is not to be ignored. States’ capacity to deal with global issues within 
economical systems, though, is to be increased only if them, and their institutions, learn to 
treat the world properly. Institutional Innovation is the usual solution, and, thus, shall 
increase, as institutions slowly learn to deal with different actors. There is much risk, of 
course, until they are fully adapted, as poorly explained matters may lead to a poor 
understanding of economical matters and, thus, to economical problems that can affect any 
instance of an economical chain, as explained by a complex system’s analysis, for instance. 
The third assessment is over society. As said by Badie, institutions gradually need to 
deal with sociological aspects of society, as it rises to become, aware or not of it, actors on 
international relations. In this sense, considering the main factors for the empowerment of 
individuals are technological development and an increased capacity to understand the world 
and its possibilities (which Rosenau calls an increased intellectual capacity), and how these 
trends are to continue growing, I cannot but think of a scenario in which individuals become 
more and more aware of their capacity to participate. As this participation often comes within 
social media broadcasting of information, a critic can be posed. What is the real capacity of 
individual users on the Internet, for example, to organize globally and tackle global issues? 
The US’s NSA and Gordon Brown may agree it this capacity is latent and, therefore, there is 
potential for individuals to make the difference and really shape the world, or increase risks 
within it. Mikko Hypponen, on the other side, although recognizing the importance of taking 
into account the rights of individuals (on privacy, for example), presents an assessment that 
drives us towards thinking governments are able to control the outcomes of those interactions, 
at some extent. In my opinion, as they still are the main actors of most international instances, 
this ability exists, and poses an advantage as they can, thus, be in charge of matters and solve 
problems. This is a limited feature, though, as individual empowerment and the ecosystems 
involved, as well as the emergence characteristics of the complex system at stake evolve. In 




The fourth and last assessment is on global issues. I have pointed how new global 
issues may arise, as the increased capacity of individuals to act globally enters into stage. 
Disease related risks; information security, resource management and environmental issues 
arise as the possible challenges of the century, which will have to be faced. The shown 
analytical tools and conclusions regarding the increased autonomy of individuals to gather 
and solve problems are important, and Gordon Brown attests it. There are even some 
solutions and paths that ignore the existence of states to use private actors as the sole solutions 
and sources of control to deal with32. One cannot, though, ignore the importance of the State 
within those solutions. States still concentrate power, influence and resources, and even 
considering them as simply actors within the international arena would have to consider them 
powerful actors, as they comprise lots of other actors within, and help different actors gather, 
as they provide public services and the structure for debate, for example. In this sense, I 
would advise for the prioritization of a public-private partnership, where resources are used to 
solve problems as problems arise. 
An extra assessment would describe how those issues create opportunities for private 
actors to share and distribute, i.e., technology they have developed within different nations, in 
a way that a global chain of knowledge is pledged to exist and may be an option for the 
gathering and interactions between people, as borders loosen and global citizens arise from 
such partnerships. 
This is, indeed, the utmost level of development for globalization, in my opinion. As 
borders loosen, institutions adapt, power decentralizes and individuals are made aware of the 
world they live in and on how they can influence it, interactions shall become part of the daily 
life, inasmuch technology provides assets for better analysis on trends and for a better 
management of a world, still comprised of nations, but maybe, and just maybe, not anymore 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  For	  instance,	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  a	  WWF	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  to	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  40-­‐70%	  of	  global	  commodities	  
into	  sustainable	  production	  by	  tackling	  the	  top	  100	  companies	  that	  control	  production	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